摘要
随着售电市场竞争加剧,独立型售电公司作为新型市场主体,面临着“批零倒挂”和“偏差考核”风险,且其售电服务质量具有事前不可观测性,面临着信息不对称风险,优化其售电策略具有重要的理论和现实意义.不同售电服务质量类型的独立型售电公司具有不同的购电成本和偏差控制能力,故销售电价和偏差考核分摊比例(简称分摊比例)可以成为传递独立型售电公司服务质量的有效信号.本研究考虑销售电价和分摊比例对电力用户策略选择的影响,分别建立了独立型售电公司售电策略的销售电价、分摊比例单信号博弈模型和双信号博弈模型,求解了博弈模型的贝叶斯纳什均衡,比较了不同信号博弈均衡结果及其实现分离均衡的条件,得到了独立型售电公司最优策略.结果表明不同于销售电价信号,分摊比例信号和双信号均可以规避售电市场逆向选择风险,但使用双信号有助于降低售电公司的最优分摊比例和销售电价,增加其销售电量和利润,且实现分离均衡的条件更宽松.本研究可为规范我国电力市场运行、提升电力市场运行效率提供决策支持。
With the intensifying competition in the electricity sales market,independent electricity sales com-panies,as new market entities,face the risks of"batch and zero upside down"and"bias assessment".As the electricity sales service quality is unobservable beforehand,they also face the risk of information asymme-try.Therefore,optimizing their electricity sales strategy has important theoretical and practical significance.Independent power sales companies with different types of power sales service quality have different power pur-chase costs and deviation control capabilities,so the sales price and deviation assessment apportionment ratio(hereinafter referred to as apportionment ratio)can be an effective signal to convey the service quality of inde-pendent power sales companies.Considering the influence of the sales price and apportionment ratio on power users'strategy choices,this paper establishes a single-signal game model based on the apportionment ratio,a dual-signal game model,and the independent electricity sales company's sales price strategy.Furthermore,it solves the Bayesian game model.Moreover,it compares the equilibrium results of different signal game,ana-lyzes the conditions for achieving a separation equilibrium,and obtains the optimal strategy for an independent retail electricity company.The results show that,unlike the sales price signal,both the apportionment ratio signal and the dual signal can mitigate the risk of adverse selection in the electricity sales market.However,using the dual signal can help lower the optimal apportionment ratio and the sales price of the electricity sales company while increasing its electricity sales and profits.Moreover,the conditions for achieving a separation equilibrium are more relaxed.This research can provide decision-making support for regulating the operation of China's electricity market and improving the efficiency of electricity market operation.
作者
方德斌
赵朝阳'
李娅妮
FANG De-bin;ZHAO Chao-yang;LI Ya-ni(Research Center for Complexity Science and Management,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China;Research Center for Forging a Strong Sense of Community for the Chinese Nation of South-central Minzu University,Wuhan 430074,China)
出处
《管理科学学报》
北大核心
2025年第7期96-113,共18页
Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金
国家社会科学资金资助项目(19ZDA083)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(72243010)。
关键词
售电服务质量
逆向选择
售电策略优化
信号博弈
分离均衡
electricity sales service quality
adverse selection
power sales strategy optimization
signal game
separation equilibrium
作者简介
方德斌(1976-),男,安徽舒城人,博士,教授,博士生导师.Email:dbfang@whu.edu.cn。
