摘要
在项目建设过程中,承包商通常表现出过度自信倾向,在计划阶段低估项目风险,由此导致工程延期、成本超支等不良后果。本文研究承包商过度自信行为对项目计划调度的影响,以及业主针对工期设置奖惩机制对承包商过度自信行为的激励效果。文章考虑承包商的过度自信表现为低估工期噪音方差,通过引入过度自信系数,基于不确定性理论构建考虑承包商过度自信的最小化成本机会约束模型;同时建立考虑业主设置奖惩机制的模型,对比分析奖惩机制对过度自信行为的影响。随后设计遗传算法求解。工程实例和仿真实验的结果表明,过度自信会降低承包商制定的调度计划在实际施工中应对风险干扰的能力,造成项目延期、成本超支,而业主设置奖惩机制能够有效减少过度自信的影响。本文的研究揭示了承包商过度自信对项目计划调度的负面影响,验证了奖惩机制对于减少过度自信影响的有效性,对于提高工程项目管理效率和减少管理风险具有指导意义。
Humans often exhibit psychological biases in decision-making,and one of the most common phenomena is overconfidence.In the project construction process,owing to the advantages of advanced construction technology,rich historical data,and sufficient resource reserves,contractors usually overestimate their ability to control risk factors during the project planning stage and show a tendency toward overconfidence.Suppose the contractor fails to fully consider risks during the planning stage.In that case,their overconfidence tendency will result in significant negative consequences,such as their implementation being affected by uncertainties,project delays,and cost overruns.Therefore,it is necessary to analyze the specific impact of contractor overconfidence on project scheduling and propose corresponding preventive measures.This study examines the project-scheduling problem by considering contractor overconfidence in an uncertain environment.In practice,projects often face various uncertainties that may arise from the following sources:policy changes,severe weather,and equipment damage.The uncertainty theory proposed by Professor Liu Baoding provides a framework for handling such uncertainty factors and has been applied to project scheduling research.However,existing studies do not consider the psychological factors of contractor overconfidence when underestimating risk.This study introduced the overconfidence level coefficient to study the impact of contractor overconfidence on project scheduling.It then established a chance-constraint programming model based on the uncertainty theory.The goal of this model is to minimize the total project cost,considering contractor overconfidence,which considers the noise caused by risk factors into consideration.In this model,we quantitatively analyzed the influence of contractors’underestimation of noise variance owing to overconfidence.In project management,scholarly research on overconfidence is mostly based on the principal-agent model,and no research on the impact of overconfidence on project scheduling schemes has been conducted so far.This study examines the phenomenon of overconfidence from the perspective of project planning and discusses the influence of contractors’overconfidence psychology and behavior deviation on the arrangement of project activities,as well as the negative effects caused by such influence.It is common for the owner to set a reward and punishment mechanism based on the project duration to explore whether the risk of project delays and cost overruns caused by contractor overconfidence can be reduced by a reasonable incentive mechanism.The model is built under the circumstance that the owner sets a reward and punishment mechanism and compares and analyzes the incentive effect of the reward and punishment mechanism on the overconfident contractor.A simulation experiment was conducted to analyze whether setting reward and punishment mechanisms can effectively reduce the negative effects of the contractor's overconfidence.In this study,a genetic algorithm was designed according to the characteristics of the problem,the practicability of the algorithm was verified by a practical project,and a sensitivity analysis of the parameters was carried out.The results show that 1)overconfidence affects the contractor's project activity arrangement,resulting in a longer project completion duration and a lower probability of on-time completion,as well as accuracy of cost prediction.The contractor is more affected by a higher level of overconfidence.2)The owner's reward and punishment mechanism based on completion duration can encourage highly confident contractors to shorten the completion duration and improve on-time completion.The mechanism was found to be more effective for highly confident contractors,whereas rational contractors were less affected.3)The reward and punishment mechanism will give the overconfidence level a certain threshold,beyond which the influence of overconfidence will no longer intensify with the increase of the overconfidence level.This study reveals the negative impact of contractor overconfidence on project construction,verifies the effectiveness of reward and punishment mechanisms in reducing the impact of overconfidence,and has important practical significance and theoretical value for improving project management efficiency and reducing management risk.
作者
姚宗宇
张立辉
曹蔷楠
刘小丽
YAO Zongyu;ZHANG Lihui;CAO Qiangnan;LIU Xiaoli(School of Economics and Management,North China Electric Power University,Beijing 102206,China;Pioneer College Inner Mongolia University,Inner,Mongolia 010021,China)
出处
《管理工程学报》
北大核心
2025年第4期284-296,共13页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(72171081)。
作者简介
通讯作者:张立辉(1974-),男,湖南宁乡人,华北电力大学经济与管理学院教授,博士生导师,研究方向:项目调度与项目优化。
