摘要
以绿色物流发展为背景,构建一个涵盖物流企业、消费者和政府三方的演化博弈模型,旨在探究各主体在绿色物流推进过程中的行为动态及策略选择,并深入分析三者间的互动机制。研究表明,消费者的支付意愿系数、消费者效用以及政府补贴对绿色物流的推广与发展具有重要影响。通过数值仿真发现,较高的支付意愿系数和消费者效用能够显著增强企业实施绿色物流的动力,而政府补贴通过降低企业绿色转型成本,进一步激励企业积极参与,尤其在消费者支付意愿较低时,补贴政策能够有效弥补市场激励的不足。此外,政府补贴与消费者效用之间存在互补关系:当消费者效用较高时,企业对补贴的依赖程度较低;而当效用较低时,适度增加补贴能够显著提升系统的稳定性。当政府补贴达到“最小补贴阈值”时,补贴可以替代监管压力,推动绿色物流自发扩散。通过优化补贴政策、提升消费者环保意识以及激励企业技术创新,三方协同机制能够有效解决市场激励不足的问题,推动绿色物流可持续发展,最终助力全社会可持续发展目标的实现。
In the context of green logistics development,this study constructs an evolutionary game model involving three key actors-logistics enterprises,consumers,and the government-to examine their behavioral dynamics and strategic choices in the advancement of green logistics.The model also investigates the interactive mechanisms among the three parties.The findings indicate that consumers’willingness-to-pay coefficient,consumer utility,and government subsidies are crucial factors influencing the promotion and development of green logistics.Numerical simulations reveal that a higher willingness to pay and greater consumer utility significantly enhance enterprises’motivation to adopt green logistics practices.Government subsidies,by reducing the cost of green transformation,further encourage enterprise participation.This effect is particularly evident when consumer willingness to pay is low,as subsidies can effectively compensate for insufficient market-driven incentives.In addition,there exists a complementary relationship between government subsidies and consumer utility:when consumer utility is high,enterprises are less reliant on subsidies;when utility is low,moderate increases in subsidies can significantly improve system stability.Once government support reaches the"minimum subsidy threshold,"subsidies can serve as a substitute for regulatory pressure,fostering the spontaneous diffusion of green logistics practices.By optimizing subsidy policies,enhancing consumer environmental awareness,and encouraging enterprise technological innovation,the tripartite coordination mechanism can effectively address market incentive deficiencies,foster sustainable development of green logistics,and ultimately contribute to the broader goal of societal sustainability.
作者
陈丽红
CHEN Lihong(Panzhihua Municipal Market Regulation Administration,Panzhihua,Sichuan 617000,China)
出处
《物流技术》
2025年第6期49-60,共12页
Logistics Technology
基金
2024年度山西省财经高质量发展重大专项研究课题(SXCJGZLYB002)。
关键词
绿色物流
演化博弈
政府补贴
可持续发展
green logistics
evolutionary game
government subsidies
sustainable development
作者简介
陈丽红,管理学硕士,攀枝花市市场监督管理局经济师。研究方向为循环经济、企业战略。
