摘要
随着经济的飞速发展和信息技术的迅速普及,消费者需求日新月异。越来越多的零售商除了销售制造商的品牌产品外,还销售自有产品来满足消费者需求。自有产品已经成为零售商扩大零售市场份额、增加市场话语权,以及增加利润和创造品牌价值的重要手段。自有产品的引入导致零售商与制造商直接竞争,这使得产品的运作决策变得更加复杂和重要。针对零售商引入质量低于或高于品牌产品的自有产品,制造商选择代售或转售模式来销售品牌产品等问题,构建了自有产品质量和品牌产品销售模式选择的博弈模型。首先分别在引入低质量和高质量自有产品情况下,研究了品牌产品销售模式选择策略,结果表明引入低质量自有产品会增加制造商选择代售模式的可能性,而引入高质量自有产品时制造商只能选择代售模式。随后讨论了自有产品的质量选择策略,结果表明引入高质量自有产品并不总是对零售商有利,如果高质量自有产品与品牌产品质量差异很小,且低质量自有产品与品牌产品质量有一定差异,引入低质量自有产品对零售商有利。
With the rapid development of the economy and fast spread of Internet technology,consumer demands are changing rapidly.More and more retailers sell their store-brand products in addition to manufacturers’national-brand ones to meet the ever-changing consumer demands.The introduction of store-brand products has become an important means for retailers to expand their retail market share,have their say more in the market,increase profits,and create brand value.Retailers often position their store-brand products as lower-quality alternatives to national-brand ones,attracting low-end consumers through lower retail prices.However,as the status of retailers in the retail market rises,some retailers have introduced store-brand products of higher quality than national-brand ones to meet high-end consumer demand.Therefore,introducing store-brand products of lower or higher quality than national-brand ones is a key concern for retailers.On the other hand,manufacturers usually adopt the resale mode to sell their products,i.e.,the manufacturer wholesales its products to the retailer who then sets the retail price and sells them to consumers.However,with the development of Internet technology and emergence of e-commerce platforms,some manufacturers have adopted the agency mode to sell their products,i.e.,the manufacturer sells its products directly to consumers through the platform and venues provided by retailers,and retailers make profits from the commissions or revenue sharing of the products paid by the manufacturer.In recent years,the agency mode has become increasingly popular in the platform supply chain.Therefore,in the face of the threat of the introduction of retailers’products,which mode should manufacturers adopt to sell national-brand products,and how does the quality of the store-brand products introduced by retailers affect the strategy of choosing a sales mode for manufacturers’national-brand ones?To address the above issues,this paper establishes a competitive game model of product quality and sales mode choice between a national-brand product manufacturer and a store-brand product retailer.In addition to selling the manufacturer’s national-brand products,the retailer can also introduce its store-brand products with lower or higher quality than the manufacturer’s national-brand ones for sale.Faced with the introduction of store-brand products,the manufacturer can choose either the resale mode or the agency mode to sell its national-brand products.This paper focuses on the interaction between the qualities of the store-brand product and national-brand product sales modes and its effect.Firstly,this paper explores the pricing of the two products and the optimal sales mode for national-brand products with an introduction of low-quality and high-quality store-brand products,respectively.The results show that if the retailer introduces high-quality store-brand products,then the manufacturer can only choose the agency mode,while the introduction of low-quality store-brand products by the retailer increases the likelihood that the manufacturer will choose the agency mode.Secondly,the quality selection strategy of retailers’store-brand products is discussed,and the results show that the introduction of high-quality store-brand products is not always favorable to retailers,and the introduction of low-quality store-brand products is favorable to retailers if there is a small difference between the quality of high-quality store-brand products and that of national-brand ones,and if the quality of low-quality store-brand products differs from that of national-brand ones to a certain extent.Finally,the numerical example validates these conclusions.
作者
李华冰
曹宗宏
LI Huabing;CAO Zonghong(Foundation Department of Xuancheng Campus,Hefei University of Technology,Xuancheng 242000,China;School of Mathematics and Physics,Anhui Jianzhu University,Hefei 230601,China)
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2024年第12期92-99,共8页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(72271004)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(24YJA630004)
安徽省人文社会科学基金重点项目(SK2020A0277)
安徽省高校优秀拔尖人才培育资助项目(gxyqZD2019058)
安徽建筑大学博士启动基金项目(2019QDZ04)。
关键词
自有产品
转售
代售
谈判能力
store brand product
resell
agency
negotiating ability
作者简介
李华冰(1978-),男,湖北随州人,硕士,讲师,研究方向:供应链管理;通讯作者:曹宗宏(1980-),男,安徽六安人,博士,教授,硕士生导师,研究方向:物流与供应链管理,运筹与优化。
