摘要
分析欧式经贸协定实体性劳工条款在欧盟—韩国劳动争端解决中的发展,有助于揭示欧式“柔性”劳工条款在争端解决中被转化为法律义务的过程。即通过专家组对《韩欧自由贸易协定》13.4.3条的解释,无论批准与否,缔约国事实上要遵守ILO的核心劳工公约。专家组将政治宣示性条款“硬化”为法律义务的做法缺乏法律和政治基础,并会引发政治反噬。《中欧全面投资协定》也包含了与《韩欧自由贸易协定》高度相似的实体性劳工条款,中国若不谨慎应对,可能在未来面临韩国现在所面临的法律风险。
This paper analyzes the development of the substantive labor provisions in EU-Style economic agreements through the EU-Korea labor dispute resolution process,revealing how the EU’s“soft”labor provisions were transformed into legally binding obligations during dispute settlement.Specifically,through the panel’s interpretation of Article 13.4.3 of the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement,contracting parties are effectively required to comply with the ILO’s core labor conventions,regardless of whether they have ratified them.This paper critiques the panel’s approach of“hardening”politically declaratory clauses into legal obligations,arguing that such an interpretation lacks a solid legal and political foundation and is likely to provoke political backlash.The China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment also contains substantive labor provisions highly similar to those in the EU-Korea FTA.If China does not respond prudently,it may face the same legal risks that Korea is currently encountering.
作者
贾海龙
蓝小军
Jia Hailong;Lan Xiaojun
出处
《学术研究》
北大核心
2025年第2期47-54,177,共9页
Academic Research
作者简介
贾海龙,华南理工大学公共管理学院教授、博士生导师;蓝小军,华南理工大学公共管理学院博士研究生(广东广州,510006)。
