摘要
宅基地“三权分置”作为近年来部分农村地区对现行宅基地制度的改革探索,也是学术界的研究热点领域。目前,宅基地“三权分置”的体系内涵与实践路径研究颇多,而改革过程中多元主体的行为博弈研究有待进一步完善。本文以诸暨市“三权三票”为例,采用定量分析方法,构建了改革过程中基层政府、村集体与农户三方的演化博弈模型,得出均衡点并分析其稳定性;运用Matlab软件对三方主体的行为演化过程进行模拟仿真,探究影响系统演化的关键因素,分析参数变动对系统演化的影响。结果表明:宅基地改革中三方主体的最优行为策略组合为“政府减少行政干预、适度绩效激励”“村集体自负盈亏、积极推进”“农户衡量机会成本、利益最大化”;此外,村集体的初始意愿是关键影响因素,其初始意愿概率值越高,模型达成理想均衡状态越快;农户不退出时的机会成本也会影响农户退出意愿等。
As an exploration of the reform of the current homestead system in some rural areas in recent years,the“separation of three rights”of homestead is also a hot research area in the academic community.At present,there are many studies on the system connotation and practical path of the“separation of three rights”of homestead,but the research on the behavior game of multiple subjects in the reform process needs to be further improved.Taking the“three rights and three votes”in Zhuji City as an example,this paper uses quantitative analysis methods to construct an evolutionary game model of grassroots government,village collectives and rural households in the reform process,obtains the equilibrium point and analyzes its stability,and then uses Matlab software to simulate the behavior evolution process of the tripartite subject,explore the key factors affecting the evolution of the system,and analyze the impact of parameter changes on the evolution of the system.The results show that the optimal combination of behavioral strategies of the three parties in the homestead reform is as follows:“the government reduces administrative intervention and moderately incentives for performance”“the village collectives are responsible for their own profits and losses and actively promotes”“farmers measure the opportunity cost and maximize the benefits”;In addition,the initial willingness of the village collective is the key influencing factor,and the higher the probability value of the initial willingness,the faster the model reaches the ideal equilibrium state;The opportunity cost of farmers who do not quit will also affect their willingness to quit.
作者
臧增辉
陈红霞
赵振宇
ZANG Zenghui;CHEN Hongxia;ZHAO Zhenyu(School of Law,Ningbo University,Zhejiang Ningbo 315211,China)
出处
《上海国土资源》
2024年第4期208-213,共6页
Shanghai Land & Resources
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目“闲置宅基地转为集体经营性用地衔接机制研究”(24ASH009)
浙江省社科规划“党的二十届三中全会和省委十五届五次全会精神研究阐释”专项课题“宅基地退出改革主体行为逻辑研究——基于诸暨‘三权三票’的样本考察”。
关键词
宅基地
三权分置
演化博弈
模拟仿真
homestead
three rights separation
evolutionary game
simulation
作者简介
臧增辉(1998-),男,硕士生,研究方向为土地制度与政策.E-mail:1943336300@qq.com;通信作者:陈红霞(博士/教授/博导),宁波大学MPA教育中心主任,chenhongxia@nbu.edu.cn。
