摘要
本文针对新产品双渠道供应链协同方式上市所面临的渠道冲突问题,考虑到消费者线上学习行为,构建了制造商主导定价和匹配定价两种策略下的Stackelberg博弈模型,分析了新产品的最优价格,并探讨了消费者学习行为对新产品价格和制造商期望收益的影响,为制造商制定新产品价格提供了决策依据。研究结果表明:当学习型消费者较少时,无论学习成本的大小,制造商主导定价策略能够实现供应链成员的“双赢”。当学习型消费者较多且学习成本较小时,零售商采取匹配定价的方式可以有效防止学习型消费者的转移,实现供应链成员收益的帕累托改进。
To address the problem of channel conflict faced by the new product’s dual-channel supply chain synergistic approach to market,the Stackelberg game model with two strategies of manufacturer-led pricing and matching pricing is constructed by considering consumers’online learning behavior,and the optimal price of the new product is analyzed,and the impact of consumers’learning behavior on the price of the new product and the manufacturer’s expected revenue is explored to provide a basis for the manufacturer to set the price of the new product.The results show that when there are fewer learning consumers,regardless of the size of the learning cost,the manufacturer-led pricing strategy can achieve a’win-win’for supply chain members.When there are many learning consumers and the learning cost is low,the retailer can effectively prevent the transfer of learning consumers and achieve Pareto improvement of supply chain members'revenue by matching pricing.
作者
李豪
田雅钦
LI Hao;TIAN Yaqin(Research Center for Transportation and Economic and Social Development in Western 400074,Chongqing,China;School of Economics and Management,Chongqing JiaoTong University,400074,Chongqing,China)
出处
《特区经济》
2024年第10期93-96,共4页
Special Zone Economy
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“共建共治共享背景下网约车市场治理的多方联动机制研究”(19XGL016)。
关键词
学习行为
新产品
供应链协同上市
主导定价
匹配定价
Learning Behavior
New Products
Supply Chain Co-listing
Dominant Pricing
Matching Pricing
作者简介
李豪(1982-),男,四川乐山人,重庆交通大学教授,博士。研究方向:收益管理、交通经济;通讯作者:田雅钦(1996-),女,重庆人,重庆交通大学硕士研究生。研究方向:收益管理。
