摘要
查默斯的“核心论题”基于三个应然预设,其中两个较为明显,即“重大问题上的真理”和“大规模的集体趋同”理应都是哲学上取得更多进步的必要条件;还有一个较为隐秘,即“更多的进步”理应是哲学的学科目标。斯图尔加和布洛克反驳了查默斯的实然立场,但是他们仍然共享了查默斯的上述应然预设,因此并不令人满意。本文对上述预设提出批评,其中两个是内部批评:一方面,“重大问题上的真理”不是哲学进步的必要条件,真理与集体趋同并无必然联系;另一方面,“大规模的集体趋同”既不是哲学进步的必要条件,也不是其充分条件,集体趋同与哲学进步并无必然联系。此外提出一个外部批评:基于价值多元论立场,“更多的进步”与哲学的学科性质并无必然联系,进步只是哲学的诸多目标之一。据此我们认为,查默斯的“核心论题”实际上陷入了下述“哲学进步的迷思”:真理迷思、趋同迷思以及进步迷思。
According to David Chalmers'“Central Thesis”,the reason why philosophy has no more progress is that philosophers lack a large collective convergence around the truth on big questions.The thesis is based on two obvious assumptions,namely,that“truth on big questions”and“large collective conve rgence”should both be necessary for more philosophical progress;and that there is also a hidden assumption that“more progress”should be the disciplinary goal of philosophy.Daniel Stoljar and Stuart Brock refute Chalmers'de facto position,but they still share the latter's de jure presupposition.In view of these presuppositions,this paper first puts forward two internal criticisms:“truth on big questions”is not a necessary condition for philosophical progress,and truth is not necessarily related to collective convergence;“large collective convergence”is neither a necessary nor suffcient condition for philosophical progress,and there is no inevitable connection between collective convergence and philosophical progress.Secondly,an extemal criticism is proposed:based on the viewpoint of value pluralism,more progress is not necessarily related to the disciplinary nature of philosophy,and progress is only one of the many goals of philosophy.If the criticism is valid,Chalmers'“central thesis”actually falls into the following“myths of philosophical progress”:the myth of truth,the myth of convergence,and the myth of progress.
出处
《世界哲学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第2期79-86,160,F0003,共10页
World Philosophy
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目“人类命运共同体视域下的21世纪西方激进左翼文论批判研究”(项目编号:20&ZD290)的阶段性成果。
