摘要
结合产学研创新主体的知识属性与特征,根据产、学研双方投入的知识协同成本、获得的知识协同收益、知识协同保障机制等一系列因素为基础,运用演化博弈理论探究创新主体的知识协同演化行为及其稳定性问题。构建产学研演化博弈模型,并通过理论推导和仿真模拟分析产学研协同创新个体及整体利益最大化的帕累托最优状态。研究发现:在产学研协同创新过程中,知识协同存在知识供需关系,双方投入的知识协同成本(知识贡献成本、知识溢出风险、知识加工成本)过高会抑制创新主体的协同意愿,不利于系统帕累托改进;资金收益与学术收益的增加会提高双方的协同积极性,而背叛收益与协同积极性呈负相关;合理的知识协同成本投入与知识协同收益分配、完善的知识资源共享机制、有效的知识协同激励与惩罚机制以及健全的法律措施是产学研协同创新稳定运行的关键。
Combined with the knowledge attributes and characteristics of the innovation subject of industry,university and research,and based on a series of factors such as the knowledge collaboration cost invested by industry,university and research,the knowledge collaboration income obtained,and the knowledge collaboration guarantee mechanism,the evolutionary game theory is used to explore the knowledge collaboration evolution behavior and stability of the innovation subject.It builds the game model of industry university research evolution,and analyzes the Pareto optimal state of individual and overall benefit maximization of industry university research collaborative innovation through theoretical derivation and simulation.It finds that:In the process of collaborative innovation of industry,university and research,there is a relationship between supply and demand of knowledge collaboration,and the high cost of knowledge collaboration(knowledge contribution cost,knowledge spillover risk,knowledge processing cost)invested by both parties will inhibit the willingness of innovation subjects to collaborate,which is not conducive to Pareto improvement of the system;The increase of capital income and academic income will improve the cooperation enthusiasm of both parties,while the betrayal income is negatively related to the cooperation enthusiasm;The key to the stable operation of industry university research collaborative innovation lies in reasonable knowledge collaboration cost input and knowledge collaboration income distribution,perfect knowledge resource sharing mechanism,effective knowledge collaboration incentive and punishment mechanism,and sound legal measures.Based on the theoretical analysis results,there are many possibilities for the long-term evolution of industry university research collaborative innovation,and the specific direction of evolution mainly depends on the parameter values and coefficients of the evolution game matrix of industry university research collaborative innovation.Therefore,the following management enlightenment is obtained and corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are put forward.(1)Promote the public sharing of information and knowledge resources and improve the efficiency of knowledge collaboration.Make full use of new technologies such as big data,cloud computing and artificial intelligence to build a knowledge sharing and collaboration platform to increase the depth and breadth of the knowledge network,strengthen the exchange and sharing of explicit and implicit knowledge,promote close cooperation between industry,university and research,upstream,middle and downstream,large,small and medium-sized enterprises,and improve the contribution of innovation entities in knowledge collaboration.(2)Establish an effective incentive and punishment mechanism for knowledge collaboration,and form a new pattern of knowledge management in which multiple subjects participate and collaborate effectively.It should strengthen overall planning and coordination,strengthen the role of the government in collaborative innovation,give full play to the role of government investment guidance funds,and make full use of policy combination tools such as scientific research funds,tax incentives,cost relief,and talent technology support to reasonably guide the research and development of industrial innovation technologies,so as to enhance the risk tolerance of innovation activities.(3)Establish an evaluation mechanism for the integrity knowledge of the innovation subject,and improve the distribution policy oriented to increasing the value of knowledge.It should improve the classification and evaluation system of knowledge achievements,adopt different evaluation standards and methods for basic research,application research,technology development and industrialization achievements,vigorously develop market-oriented evaluation,guide and standardize third-party evaluation of knowledge achievements.Solve the problems of intellectual property damage and lack of credit existing in the process of collaborative innovation of industry,university and research,and build a platform for all kinds of innovation subjects to relax and reduce burdens and remove obstacles.(4)It should support innovative enterprises to take the lead in establishing innovation consortia and promote collaborative innovation between industry,university and research.It should promote the gathering of various innovative elements in enterprises,promote collaborative innovation among large,small and medium-sized enterprises,foster and expand innovative enterprise clusters,improve the innovation resource integration capability of leading enterprises,and play a leading role in intellectual property rights,technical standards,supply chain security,etc.It should accelerate the establishment of a number of innovation consortia led by innovative leading enterprises,supported by colleges and universities,and coordinated by innovation entities,so as to promote the integration of production,teaching,research and use.
作者
石琳娜
陈劲
SHI Linna;CHEN Jin(School of Economics and Management,Research Center for Technological Innovation,Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084,China;Sichuan Academy of Science and Technology for Development,Chengdu 610041,China)
出处
《科学学与科学技术管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2023年第9期67-81,共15页
Science of Science and Management of S.& T.
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(21BGL060)
国家自然科学基金项目(71602132)
四川省科技厅科技计划项目(2021JDR0053,2023JDR0001)。
关键词
产学研协同创新
知识协同
稳定性
演化博弈
industry-university-research collaborative innovation
knowledge collaboration
stability
evolutionary game theory
作者简介
通信作者:石琳娜(1987-),女,汉族,河南平顶山人,四川省科学技术发展战略研究院副研究员,清华大学经济管理学院访问学者,中组部“西部之光人才计划,研究方向:技术创新管理、知识管理,SLN871218@163.com;陈劲(1968-),男,汉族,浙江余姚人,清华大学技术创新研究中心主任,清华大学经济管理学院教授、博士生导师、长江学者,研究方向:技术创新管理、知识管理。