摘要
疫苗是构筑疫情防线的关键,政府所采取的激励政策对民众选择是否接种疫苗具有重要的影响。首先,结合当前疫情仍具不确定性的背景,从不同的疫情情形出发,引入了社会收益系数、政府激励成本以及民众接种成本等参数;其次,建立了民众-政府的演化博弈模型,对比分析了不同疫情状态下系统达到均衡点时条件的异同以及演化轨迹,并且对实际情况进行了仿真模拟。结果表明:政府采取的激励措施与民众的选择存在一定的相互影响,减少民众的心理成本、普及接种疫苗所带来的社会收益是鼓励民众接种疫苗的关键。研究结果不仅为政府采取何种激励措施给予了决策参考,还为政府根据民众行为以及疫情变化及时调整政策提供了依据。
Vaccines are the key to building a defense against epidemics.The incentives adopted by the government have a significant impact on whether people choose to be vaccinated.First,in the context of the current epidemic's uncertainty,the parameters,such as social gain coefficient,government incentive cost and vaccination cost of people,were introduced from different epidemic scenarios.Second,the evolutionary game model of the people-government was established.The similarities and differences of the conditions and the evolutionary trajectory were compared when the system reached the equilibrium point under different epidemic states.The results show that government incentives interact people's choices.Reducing the psychological costs of people and publicizing the social benefits of vaccination are crucial to encourage people to get vaccinated.The conclusion not only provides reference for the government to adopt incentive measures,but also provides a basis for the government to adjust its policies in response to changes in public behavior and epidemics.
作者
苏强
晏任斯
孙淑慧
SU Qiang;YAN Rensi;SUN Shuhui(College of Economic and Management,Tongji University,Shanghai 201804,China)
出处
《工业工程与管理》
CSCD
北大核心
2023年第3期121-134,共14页
Industrial Engineering and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71972146)。
关键词
疫苗
政府激励措施
社会收益
演化博弈
vaccine
government incentives
social benefits
evolutionary game
作者简介
苏强(1969-),山西壶关人,教授,博士生导师,研究方向为质量管理和医疗服务质量。E-mail:suq@tongji.edu.cn;通信作者:晏任斯,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为医疗质量管理。Email:2030384@tongji.edu.cn。
