摘要
康德在其“前批判”时期通过对莱布尼茨主义的“实在性”(realitas)概念加以反思,走出了莱布尼茨主义形而上学框架,并逐渐建立其先验哲学。莱布尼茨主义将“实在性”理解为那些要在理智中被把握的、被设定在事物自身之上的各类肯定的规定性,是一种“智性的实在性”。康德对这一概念的反思过程可分成三个关键的步骤:第一,实存与实在性的分离以及“实在冲突”概念的提出;第二,从“实在性”自身中区分为出一种“非智性的实在性”;第三,将实在性之根据“主体化”。这些反思的最终结果是“感性实在性”的基本思想的建立,即从感性出发来理解“实在性”的本性和根据,由此为康德将感性确立为一种独立的知识能力作了理论准备。
This paper examines Kant’s gradual departure from the Leibnizian metaphysics andestablishment of transcendental philosophy in accordance with his reflections on the Leibnizian concept of“realitas”in the“pre-critical”period.The Leibnizians consider“reality”as positive determinations positedon the things themselves,which are to be grasped by the intellect and thus called“intelligible reality”.Kant’s reflections on this concept of reality can be understood as advancing with three steps:(1)the distinction betweenexistence and reality and the proposal of the conception of“real repugnance”,(2)the suggestion of a concept of a non-intelligible reality,and(3)the subjectivization of the ground of reality.These reflections result inthe establishment of the conception of“sensible reality”which means that the nature and ground of reality iscomprehended by the sensibility.This prepares Kant for taking the sensibility to be an independent cognitivecapacity in his later transcendental philosophy.
出处
《哲学分析》
CSSCI
2023年第4期62-77,197,共17页
Philosophical Analysis
基金
国家社科基金后期资助项目“莱布尼茨主义与康德之关系的概念史和发生学研究”(项目编号:22FZXB013)阶段性成果。
作者简介
谢裕伟,中山大学哲学系、中山大学东西哲学与文明互鉴研究中心博士后、助理研究员。
