摘要
以2014—2018年度我国沪深A股上市公司作为研究样本研究影子银行对企业融资的影响。研究发现,影子银行规模与企业短贷长投呈正相关关系,即影子银行的发展规模越大,短贷长投现象越严重;而内部控制在影子银行与短贷长投中起到了负向调节作用。进一步研究发现,相较于国有企业,非国有企业中影子银行规模对短贷长投的促进作用更显著,且债务违约风险的提高是影子银行加剧短贷长投的重要途径。
Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2018 were used as research samples for verification.It is found that the scale of shadow banking is positively correlated with long-term investment with short-term loans,that is,the larger the development scale of shadow banking is,the more serious the phenomenon of long-term investment with short-term loans is.Internal control plays a negative role in shadow banking and long-term investment with short-term loans.Further research shows that compared with state-owned enterprises,the size of shadow banking in non-state-owned enterprises plays a more significant role in promoting long-term investment with short-term loans,and the increase of debt default risk is an important way for shadow banking to accelerate long-term investment with short-term loans.
作者
桂良军
李琦
GUI Liang-jun;LI Qi(Shandong Technology and Business University,Yantai 264005,China)
出处
《山东工商学院学报》
2023年第2期18-27,共10页
Journal of Shandong Technology and Business University
关键词
影子银行
短贷长投
投融资期限错配
内部控制
债务违约风险
shadow banking
long-term investment with short-term loans
mismatching of investment and financing terms
internal control
debt default risk
作者简介
桂良军,1967年生,男,安徽池州人,山东工商学院教授,博士,研究方向为现代成本管理理论与方法,(电子信箱)guilj@126.com。
