基于三方演化博弈的分析师利益关联研究被引量：1

Analyst’s interest association research based on tripartite evolutionary game

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摘要作为资本市场中信息传递的关键角色,分析师应发挥提高市场信息效率的积极作用,然而利益驱动下分析师可能发布与事实不符的研究报告.分析师乱象不仅会扰乱市场秩序,还可能会使投资者受到投资信念和资产价值的双重损害.通过构建分析师、利益集团和监管机构三方的演化博弈模型,定量地刻画了利益关联的多方制约力量的互动过程,求解出模型的均衡点,并进行了稳定性分析和仿真分析.研究发现:(1)违规合作的成本越高,收益越小,分析师和利益集团违规合作的概率越小,监管机构宽松监管的概率越大,反之亦然;(2)各方策略选择达到均衡所需时间与其他两方策略选择的概率大小有关;(3)监管约束对于打击市场违规行为是有效的.本研究定量地揭示了分析师、利益集团和监管机构三方的博弈过程,为监管机构规范和约束分析师和利益集团的行为提供了量化依据. As a key player in the capital market for information transmission,analysts should play an active role in improving the market information efficiency.However,driven by interests,analysts may issue research reports that are inconsistent with the facts.Analyst misconduct not only disrupts the market order but also may cause investors to suffer losses from both investment beliefs and asset values.By constructing an evolutionary game model of analysts,interest groups,and regulators,a quantitative characterization is made of the interaction process of the multi-party restraining forces of interest stakeholders,so as to work out the equilibrium point of the model,and a stability analysis and simulation analysis are conducted.It is found that:(1)the higher the cost of cooperation in violation,the smaller the benefit,the lower the probability of cooperation between analysts and interest groups,and the higher probability to loosen supervision on the part of regulators,and vice versa;(2)the time required for each party’s strategy choice to reach equilibrium is related to the probability of the other two parties’strategy choices;(3)regulatory constraints are effective in combating market violations.This study quantitatively reveals the gaming process among analysts,interest groups,and regulators,and provides a quantitative basis for regulators to regulate and restrain the behavior of analysts and interest groups.

作者方熙夏梦冉 FANG Xi;XIA Mengran(School of Information and Safety Engineering,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan,Hubei 430073,China;School of Mathematics and Statistics,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan,Hubei 430073,China)

机构地区中南财经政法大学信息与安全工程学院中南财经政法大学统计与数学学院

出处《内江师范学院学报》 CAS 2023年第2期98-105,共8页 Journal of Neijiang Normal University

基金中南财经政法大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(202211422)。

关键词分析师利益关联演化博弈均衡稳定策略 analyst interest association evolutionary game equilibrium and stability strategy

分类号 F224 [经济管理—国民经济]

作者简介方熙(1998-)女,河南林州人,中南财经政法大学硕士研究生,研究方向:金融信息工程;通信作者:夏梦冉(1994-)女,内蒙古赤峰人,中南财经政法大学博士研究生,研究方向:数量经济学。