摘要
鉴于公共文化PPP项目收益性弱、对私人部门吸引力不足的特点,将私人部门公平偏好引入公共文化PPP项目的政府补偿机制设计,构建了以政府为主导的两阶段公私Stackelberg博弈模型。以柳州某文化广场PPP项目为例分析了私人部门公平偏好对其初始投资决策、最优投资决策及政府补偿的影响。结果表明:博弈的第一阶段中政府初步许诺的运营期补偿力度较小,私人部门公平偏好与其初始决策投资呈正比;第二阶段确定补偿力度时,政府承诺收入率与私人部门期望收入率之差超过其参照点时,若私人部门公平偏好越高,要求政府最优运营期补偿力度越大,项目最优投资规模亦越大。研究结果可为公共文化PPP项目的补偿设计提供理论依据。
The public cultural PPP projects are characterized by low profitability and less attractive to private capital.The fairness preference of private capital is introduced into the design of government compensation mechanism of public cultural PPP project.Specifically,a government-led two-stage public-private stackelberg game model is first established.Then the impact of a private sector’s fairness preference,government compensation and optimal investment decision has been taken into account in the game model based on a typical public cultural PPP project in Liuzhou,China.The results show that in the first stage when the government makes a preliminary promise,with a low government compensation level,the fairness preference of private sector promotes its initial decision investment.In the second stage when the gap between the government promised revenue rate and the private sector expected revenue rate exceeds its reference point,meanwhile private sectors’ fairness preference is high,greater optimal government compensation during the operation period indicates larger optimal investment scale of the private sector.
作者
郑弦
杨春莉
罗纯熙
胡晓
王颖林
陈嘉滢
ZHENG Xian;YANG Chun-li;LUO Chun-xi;HU xiao;WANG Ying-lin;CHEN Jia-ying(School of Finance,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430073,China;People’s Bank of China Shiyan Branch,Shiyan 442700,China;School of Transportation and Civil Engineering,Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University,Fuzhou 350002,China)
出处
《工程管理学报》
2022年第6期90-96,共7页
Journal of Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金青年科学基金项目(71901220)
中央高校基本科研业务费项目优秀青年创新团队建设项目(2722023BY007)
中南财经政法大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(202210506)。
关键词
公共文化项目
PPP
公平偏好
政府补偿
主从博弈
public cultural projects
public-private partnership
fairness preference
government compensation
stackelberg game
作者简介
郑弦(1989-),女,博士,副教授,硕士生导师,研究方向:重大基础设施工程组织行为和组织模式,建设工程投融资,E-mail:sine2588@163.com;杨春莉(1995-),女,硕士,研究方向:建设经济;罗纯熙(1999-),女,硕士研究生,研究方向:重大基础设施工程组织行为;胡晓(1998-),男,硕士研究生,研究方向:重大基础设施工程组织行为;王颖林(1987-),女,博士,副教授,硕士生导师,研究方向:PPP项目风险管理;陈嘉滢(1998-),女,硕士研究生,研究方向:重大基础设施工程组织行为与社会责任。