摘要
通过构建公众参与下交通基础设施公私合作(publicprivate partnership,PPP)项目风险分担再谈判演化博弈模型,分析如何规避企业再谈判过程中的机会主义行为。结果表明:当企业采取非机会主义行为策略所获得的收益小于采取机会主义行为策略所获得的收益时,公众参与能促使企业采取非机会主义行为策略;在公众参与概率较低的情况下,规避企业机会主义行为的一种重要方式是提高政府对企业机会主义行为的惩罚力度;不同的公众监督水平对政府处罚力度的要求不一样,在公众监督意愿较低的情况下需要政府加大对企业的惩罚力度才能迫使企业转变机会主义行为。
By constructing an evolutionary game model under public participation,how to avoid the opportunistic behavior in risk-sharing renegotiation for transportation infrastructure public-private partnership(PPP)projects was analyzed.It is shown that public participation can force enterprises to adopt non-opportunistic behavior strategy when the benefit of non-opportunistic behavior is less than that of opportunistic behavior;the increase of punishment level for the opportunistic behavior of enterprises is an important way for the avoidance of opportunistic behavior under the low probability of public participation;a more severe goverment punishment should be taken to chang enterprises’opportunistic behavior under the low probability of public participation because the different probabilities of public participation have different requirements for government punishment.
作者
沈炜
周林意
SHEN Wei;ZHOU Linyi(School of Economics and Management,Tongji University,Shanghai 200092,China;School of International and Public Affairs,Shanghai Jiaotong University,Shanghai 200240,China)
出处
《同济大学学报（自然科学版）》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第5期635-641,共7页
Journal of Tongji University:Natural Science
基金
国家社科基金重大项目(13&ZD176)。
关键词
公众参与
公私合作
风险分担
机会主义行为
演化博弈
public participation
public-private partnership(PPP)
risk-sharing
opportunistic behavior
evolutionary game
作者简介
第一作者:沈炜(1982-),男,工学博士,主要研究方向为交通管理。E-mail:1019083652@qq.com;通信作者:周林意(1985-),男,管理学博士,主要研究方向为环境管制、风险治理。E-mail:zhoulinyi1017@163.com。
