摘要
准确提炼碳排放转移和谎报行为对供应链运营决策的影响机理,有助于提升供应链运营效率。通过构建制造商主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,分别在分散和集中情景下分析了碳转移和谎报行为对供应链运营决策的影响,并采用收益共享契约协调供应链。研究表明:产品销售价格和批发价格与供应商谎报系数正相关,供应商最优减排量与供应商谎报系数负相关;碳转移导致供应商提高批发价格;当谎报系数较小时,碳转移量增加可以提高供应商产品减排量;反之,碳转移会抑制供应商减排。
Accurately refining the impact mechanism of carbon emission transfer and misreporting behavior on supply chain operation decisions will help to improve the efficiency of supply chain operations.By constructing a manufacturer led Stackelberg game model,this paper analyzes the impact of carbon emission transfer and misreporting behavior on supply chain operation decision under decentralized and centralized situations respectively.In addition,revenue sharing contract is used to coordinate the supply chain.The research shows product sales prices and wholesale prices are positively correlated with suppliers misreporting coefficients,and supplier optimal emission reductions are negatively correlated with suppliers misreporting coefficients;carbon emission transfer behavior will lead to the increase of product wholesale price;when the supplier's misreporting coefficient is small,the increase in the amount of carbon transfer will increase the supplier's product emission reduction;conversely,the carbon transfer will inhibit the supplier's emission reduction.
作者
方穗
FANG Sui(School of Management,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,China)
出处
《物流科技》
2022年第5期139-142,167,共5页
Logistics Sci-Tech
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“碳规制下基于多重冲突均衡的供应链碳排放转移机理及优化策略研究”(71874071)。
关键词
低碳供应链
碳转移
谎报行为
STACKELBERG博弈
low carbon supply chain
carbon emission transfers
misreporting behavior
Stackelberg game model
作者简介
方穗(1996-),女,江苏南京人,江苏大学管理学院硕士研究生,研究方向:低碳供应链。
