摘要
以资金约束型原材料供应企业与非资金约束型产品制造企业为研究对象,构建了政府、银行参与下的跨区域供应链企业间的演化博弈模型。研究表明:演化稳态策略是双方均不治理或环境共治,在环境共治给双方企业带来的总收益均大于“搭便车”给各自企业带来总收益时,才可能达到环境共治的目标;刺激资金约束型供应企业的初始治理意愿效果会更好;政府环境规制下,银行融资比买方融资更合适,且随着银行融资利率的提升,会间接刺激企业双方环境治理水平;加强资金受限、污染严重地区企业的环境规制会使治理的效果更加明显。
The evolutionary game model between enterprises in the cross-regional supply chain with the participation of government and banks is constructed by taking the capital-constrained raw material supply enterprises and the non-capital-constrained product manufacturing enterprises as the research objects.The study shows that the steady-state strategy is either no governance or environmental co-governance,the goal of environmental co-governance can be achieved only when the total benefits of environmental co-governance are greater than the total benefits of“free-riding”for each enterprise;stimulating the initial willingness to govern of capital-constrained supply enterprises is more effective;bank financing is more appropriate than buyer financing under government environmental regulations,and as the interest rate of bank financing increases,it will indirectly stimulate the level of environmental governance of both enterprises;strengthening the environmental regulation of capital-constrained enterprises in severely polluted areas will make the governance effect more obvious.
作者
张敬
高铁
付芳源
房颖
ZHANG Jing;GAO Tie;FU Fangyuan;FANG Ying(School of Economics and Management,Hebei University of Technology,Tianjin 300401,China)
出处
《生态经济》
北大核心
2022年第5期203-214,共12页
Ecological Economy
基金
河北省社会科学基金项目“京津冀协同治霾的影响因素与治理路径研究”(HB17GL034)。
关键词
跨区域供应链
环境共治
银行融资
买方融资
演化博弈
cross-regional supply chain
environmental co-governance
bank financing
buyer financing
evolutionary game
作者简介
第一作者:张敬,博士,教授,博士研究生导师,研究方向为环境治理与供应链金融。E-mail:zhangjing@hebut.edu.cn。
