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舰船装备计划修理激励金设计 被引量:1

A method development of incentive fee for ship equipment scheduled repair
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摘要 [目的]旨在解决舰船装备计划修理一直采用定价成本加5%利润的成本加成定价方法且未与质量、进度挂钩、以及难以全面激励承修单位提升修理效益的问题。[方法]选择成本、质量、进度作为激励因素,将成本区分为固定和激励约束两部分来设计成本激励金,剔除甲方造成的拖期设计进度激励金,以及根据舰船装备计划修理特点建立质量特性评价指标体系,以此设计质量激励金。[结果]算例分析结果表明,承修单位通过成本、进度、质量激励金获得合理的利润激励,综合绩效较好的项目可以突破5%的利润率限制。[结论]通过建立此激励金,可有效促使承修单位控制成本、提高质量、加快进度,对完善装备激励定价机制、提高舰船装备计划修理效益具有重要的现实意义。 [Objectives]The"cost plus 5%profit"pricing method has been adopted for ship equipment scheduled repair for many years,but it does not reflect quality and schedule of repair project,so it is unable to motivate contractors to cost-effectively improve their repair work.[Methods]This paper chooses cost,schedule and quality as the incentive factors,and develops an incentive fee method which distinguishes between the fixed and incentive parts of the cost,with a schedule-based incentive fee to encourage the elimination of delays by Party A and a quality-based incentive fee to encourage the construction of a quality evaluation index based on the features of ship equipment scheduled repair.[Results]The example analyses show that the contractors can thus earn reasonable profits from contracts adopting this method,Among the examples,projects with better overall performance can break the 5%profit margin limit.[Conclusions]The method put forward in this paper can effectively motivate contractors to control their costs,improve their quality and accelerate their schedule.This is of great practical significance for perfecting the incentive fee mechanism and promoting effective ship equipment scheduled repair.
作者 魏华 王翀 WEI Hua;WANG Chong(Department of Management Engineering and Equipment Economics,Naval University of Engineering,Wuhan 430033,China;Naval Armament Department of PLAN,Beijing 100071,China)
出处 《中国舰船研究》 CSCD 北大核心 2021年第6期77-83,共7页 Chinese Journal of Ship Research
基金 国家社会科学基金项目(18BGL287)。
关键词 舰船装备 计划修理 激励金 ship equipment scheduled maintenance incentive fee
作者简介 通信作者:魏华,男,1981年生,博士,讲师。研究方向:装备价格管理。E-mail:weih81@163.com;王翀,男,1981年生,硕士,工程师。
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