摘要
针对考虑质量控制的双渠道供应链协调问题,构建了考虑质量控制的制造商与传统零售商构成的两级双渠道供应链Stackelberg博弈模型。分析了集中与分散决策下制造商的最优电子直销价、最优批发价与最优产品质量努力水平以及零售商的最优零售价,发现分散决策下最优零售价大于集中决策下的最优零售价,而其最优产品质量努力水平却小于集中决策下的最优产品质量努力水平,即不能实现协调。在此基础上引入收益共享契约模型,提出相关命题证明了当契约参数间满足一定关系、契约参数在一定范围时,收益共享契约不仅使制造商的产品质量努力水平达到了集中决策下的水平,还使供应链各成员的利润达到Pareto改进。最后,通过算例分析了关键模型参数对双渠道供应链决策和利润的影响,以及关键模型参数对收益共享契约下Pareto改进范围的影响,也验证了所提命题和契约的有效性。并发现市场需求对产品质量的敏感性越高,制造商进行产品质量改进的动力就越高;收益共享契约下Pareto改进范围受到产品质量努力水平对市场需求量的影响程度、产品质量努力成本系数和交叉价格弹性系数的影响。
A dual-channel supply chain Stackelberg game model consisting of a manufacturer that conducted quality control and a traditional retailer was built to solve the dual-channel supply chain coordination problem with considering quality control,under the price and quality sensitivity of demand.The optimal electronic direct selling price,wholesale price,and product quality effort level of the manufacturer and the optimal retail price of the retailer were analyzed under the centralized and decentralized decision.The analysis revealed the following results.The optimal retail price of the retailer at decentralized decision is more than that at centralized decision.The optimal product quality effort level of the manufacturer at decentralized decision is less than that at centralized decision,which means that the coordination of a dual-channel supply chain cannot be achieved.A revenue-sharing contract model was introduced to examine the coordination of dual-channel supply chain.The related proposition proved that when the contract parameters satisfy a certain relationship and are within a certain range, the revenue-sharing contract canencourage the manufacturer to achieve the product quality effort level of centralized decision-making and allmembers of the dual-channel supply chain can achieve Pareto improvement. Finally, numerical exampleswere used to analyze the influence of key model parameters on the decision-making and profit of thedual-channel supply chain, and the influence of key model parameters on the range of Pareto improvementunder the revenue-sharing contract, which also verified the validity of the proposition and contract. Thehigher the sensitivity of market demand to product quality, the higher the motivation for the manufacturer toimprove product quality, and the change range of the Pareto improvement under the revenue-sharing contractis also affected by the sensitivity of market demand to product quality effort level, the cost coefficient ofproduct quality effort, and the cross-price elasticity coefficient.
作者
朱梦琳
ZHU Meng-lin(School of Transportation and Logistics,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 611756,China)
出处
《交通运输工程与信息学报》
2021年第1期81-92,共12页
Journal of Transportation Engineering and Information
关键词
双渠道供应链
渠道协调
收益共享契约
质量控制
dual-channel supply chain
channel coordination
revenue-sharing contract
quality control
作者简介
朱梦琳(1995—),女,汉族,四川自贡人,硕士研究生,研究方向为物流规划与设计,E-mail:ZML__1995@163.com。
