摘要
文章在单一供应商和单一零售商的二级供应链系统下,构建了滞销品与畅销品独立销售和捆绑销售下的制造商占主导的Stackelberg博弈、零售商占主导的Stackelberg博弈以及两者同等权力下的Nash博弈模型,对各个模型下的制造商批发价、零售商零售价以及供应链利润进行了分析。研究结果表明:无论是单独销售还是捆绑销售,零售商占主导时都不会改变产品零售价,只能通过降低批发价获得更大利润;制造商和零售商都在各自占主导时获得最大利润;供应商主导时的供应链整体利润与零售商主导时的供应链整体利润相同,且低于权力相同时的供应链整体利润。
In this paper,a two-level supply chain system with a single supplier and a single retailer is studied.The game models of the independent sales and binding sales for the unsold goods and the best-selling goods are established under the Stackelberg game model dominated by the manufacturer,the Stackelberg game model dominated by the retailer,and the Nash game model with equal power,respectively.Based on the analysis of manufacturer’s wholesale price,retailer’s retail price and gross profit under each model,the following conclusions are obtained:whether the products are sold separately or bundled,retailer will not change the retail price as leader,but gain more profits by reducing the wholesale price;both manufacturer and retailer get maximum profit when they each take the lead;the overall profit of the supply chain dominated by the supplier is the same as that of the supply chain dominated by the retailer,and lower than that of the supply chain with the same power.
作者
吴思卓
汪峻萍
WU Sizhuo;WANG Junping(School of Mathematics,Hefei University of Technology,Hefei 230601,China)
出处
《合肥工业大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
北大核心
2020年第12期1703-1712,共10页
Journal of Hefei University of Technology：Natural Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571002)。
作者简介
吴思卓(1995-),女,四川彭州人,合肥工业大学硕士生;通讯作者:汪峻萍(1975-),女,安徽歙县人,博士,合肥工业大学副教授,硕士生导师,E-mail:misswangjp@sina.com.
