摘要
考虑不同渠道商的产品性价比差异以及渠道商既关注纵向供应链上的制造商利润,又关注横向供应链上的对立渠道商利润之情形,基于Stackelberg博弈理论,构建了由制造商、传统渠道商、线上渠道商及消费者组成的双渠道供应链双向公平关切模型,探究了产品性价比差异、渠道商双向公平关切对双渠道供应链最优定价和效用的影响。研究表明:在渠道商产品性价比差异下,消费者对产品性价比的敏感系数在不同程度上影响渠道商的定价决策;制造商效用与横向公平关切系数正相关,与纵向公平关切系数负相关;渠道商效用与横向公平关切系数负相关,与纵向公平关切系数正相关,且渠道商的横向公平关切行为会增加消费者的讨价还价能力,纵向公平关切行为会降低消费者的讨价还价能力。
Considering the differences in product price-performance between channel vendors and the fact that channel vendors focused on both the profitability of manufacturers in the vertical supply chain and the profitability of opposing channel vendors in horizontal supply chain,based on Stackelberg game theory,a dual-channel bidirectional fairness preference model was constructed consisting of manufacturers,traditional channels,online channels and consumers,exploring the impact of the product price-performance differences and the bidirectional fairness preference on the optimal pricing and utility of dual-channel supply chains.Research shows that with the differences in the product price-performance of channel vendors,consumers′sensitivity to the product price-performance affects channel pricing decisions to varying degrees;manufacturer′s utilities is positively correlated with horizontal fairness preference and negatively correlated with vertical fairness preference;channel′s utilities is negatively correlated with horizontal fairness preference and positively correlated with vertical fairness preference,and the channel′s horizontal fairness preference will increase consumers′bargaining power while vertical fairness preference will reduce consumers′bargaining power.
作者
范定祥
李重莲
FAN Dingxiang;LI Chonglian(School of Economics and Business,Hunan University of Technology,Zhuzhou 412007,China;Business School,Hunan University of Technology,Zhuzhou 412007,China)
出处
《工业工程与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第4期150-158,共9页
Industrial Engineering and Management
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金课题(18YJA630001)
湖南省社科成果评审委员会课题(XSP19YBC208)。
作者简介
李重莲(1995-),女,湖南邵阳人,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为渠道供应链管理。E-mail:892100654@qq.com;联系人:范定祥,副教授,博士,E-mail:17773347959@163.com。
