摘要
基于演化博弈视角研究PPP项目准备期非过失情况下社会资本提前终止补偿策略,分析补偿策略中政府部门和社会资本双方的演化稳定均衡策略。通过分析发现:政府部门提供补偿,社会资本方退出项目为系统最优稳定状态,但实现的可能性相对较小。在PPP准备期,影响社会资本方选择的最主要因素为非过失情况下保险公司支付给社会资本的保险赔款,非过失情况下项目继续进行的额外费用,从政府部门角度来看,最主要的因素为该地块未来预期效益。
Based on evolutionary game theory,this paper studies the compensation strategy of premature termination of social capital under the non-fault causes during PPP project preparation period,and analyzes the evolutionary stable equilibrium strategy of both government departments and social capital in the compensation strategy. Through the analysis,it is found that the compensation provided by government departments and the withdrawal of social capital from the project are the optimal stable state of the system,but the possibility of realization is relatively low. In the PPP preparation period,the most important factors affecting the choice of social capital parties are the insurance indemnity paid by insurance companies to social capital and the additional cost of project continuation in the case of non-fault. From the perspective of government departments,the most important factor is the expected future benefits of the plot.
作者
王松江
姜杨尚
WANG Songjiang;JIANG Yangshang(City College,Kunming University of Science and Technology,Kunming 650093,China;Faculty of Management and Economics,Kunming University of Science and Technology,Kunming 650093,China)
出处
《重庆理工大学学报（社会科学）》
CAS
2020年第7期78-87,共10页
Journal of Chongqing University of Technology（Social Science）
基金
云南省哲学社会科学规划重点项目“云南基础设施建设PPP模式多元化退出机制研究”(ZDZZD201806)。
关键词
PPP项目准备期
非过失原因
提前终止补偿
演化博弈
稳定均衡策略
PPP project preparation period
non-fault reason
premature termination compensation
evolutionary game
stable equilibrium strategy
作者简介
王松江,教授,博士生导师,主要从事项目管理、项目融资研究;通讯作者:姜杨尚,硕士研究生,主要从事项目管理、项目融资研究。
