摘要
运用契约理论、路径依赖理论解释我国家族式民办高校存在的合理性,在此基础上构建一个"完全信息下的重复博弈模型",模拟其代际传承和接班人选择问题。研究发现:基于对不确定因素的担忧,尽管有些学者设计出"选贤任能"的理想制度,但举办者依然会选择"最大最小化均衡"策略。为此,建议不必花费过多精力纠结于代际传承的制度设计是否科学,而是通过举办者的行为选择,让公众增大对民办高校未来发展的合理预期,避免在接班人问题上摇摆不定,这才是众多进入"守业"阶段的民办高校举办者必须接受的战略考验。
Taking China’s family-run non-governmental institutions of higher learning as the research objects,this paper uses contract theory and path dependence theory to explain the rationality of their existence.On this basis,a"repetitive game model with complete information"is constructed to simulate the intergenerational inheritance and succession selection problems.It is found that,based on concerns about uncertain factors,although some scholars had designed the ideal system of"selecting talents and abilities",family-run non-governmental institutions of higher learning in China still choose the"maximum and minimum equilibrium"strategy.Therefore,it is not necessary to spend too much energy on whether the system design of intergenerational inheritance is scientific.Instead,it is through the behavior choices of the organizers that the public can increase their reasonable expectation of the future development of non-governmental institutions of higher learning and avoid vacillating on the successor issue,which is the strategic test that must be accepted by the organizers who have entered the"professional"stage.
作者
孙明山
贾朝
SUN Mingshan;JIA Zhao(Yunnan University of Economics and Management,Kunming,Yunnan,650106,China;National Institute of Development Administration,Bangkok,10240,Thailand)
出处
《浙江树人大学学报》
2020年第2期1-6,共6页
Journal of Zhejiang Shuren University
基金
中国高等教育学会教育科学研究“十三五”规划课题(2016Y114)
云南省哲学社会科学教育科学规划课题(AC16018)
云南省本科高校转型发展研究资助项目(2015BZGB21)。
关键词
民办高等教育
家族式民办高校
代际传承
重复博弈
最大最小化均衡
non-governmental higher education
family-run non-governmental institutions of higher learning
intergenerational inheritance
repetitive game
maximum and minimum equilibrium
作者简介
孙明山,男,陕西西安人,副教授,泰国国立发展管理研究院博士研究生,研究方向为民办教育、公司治理。
