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消费者惰性市场中企业进入阻止的策略性行为研究

An Analysis of Strategic Behaviors of Firms in Markets with Inertia Consumers
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摘要 消费者在不同品牌产品之间进行选择时,传统的理论分析基于消费者完全理性的假设,即在纳入转换成本后,以不同品牌产品带来的净效用的大小作为选择依据。但在实际生活中,受购买环境、购买习惯、搜索成本的影响,消费者面临多种选择时往往存在惰性心理,在产品选择上表现为更倾向于重复购买,而不是与新品牌产品进行比较后理性选择购买,这赋予了在位企业额外的市场势力。已有的相关文献多集中于研究企业的策略对消费者惰性的影响,惰性消费者对在位企业的策略性行为的影响研究尚且空白。本文基于消费者惰性这一非理性行为,在动态博弈的框架下,分析随着惰性消费者比例变化,在位企业如何采取策略性行为。研究表明,随着惰性消费者比例的增加,在位企业更有激励通过限制性定价进行进入阻止。此外,惰性消费者比例越大,市场出现进入封锁的概率越小。 When consumers choose between different brand products,traditional theoretical analysis is based on the assumption of complete rationality of consumers,that is,after the conversion cost is included,the size of the net utility brought by different brand products is taken as the basis for selection.However,in real life,influenced by the purchasing environment,purchasing habits,and search costs,consumers often have a lax mentality when faced with multiple choices,and they tend to purchases repeatedly rather than comparing with new brand products.The irrational purchase choice gives the incumbent an additional market power.The existing related literature mainly focuses on the influence of enterprise's strategy on consumer inertia,and the influence of consumers inertia on the strategic behavior of the incumbent enterprise is still blank.Based on the irrational behavior of consumer inertia,this paper analyzes how the incumbent enterprise adopts strategic behavior under the framework of dynamic game.Studies have shown that as the proportion of inert consumers increases,incumbents are more motivated to enter and block through restrictive pricing.In addition,the greater the proportion of inert consumers,the less likely the market will enter the blockade.
作者 应珊珊 徐幸 YING Shan-shan;XU Xing
出处 《中央财经大学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2020年第3期70-77,共8页 Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金青年项目“基于消费者有限理性的企业竞争策略研究:前景理论的视角”(项目编号:71803123) 国家自然科学基金青年项目“互联网商业模式价格形成机制与资源配置效率研究——基于消费者信息不完美与搜寻的博弈理论视角”(项目编号:71503227)
关键词 消费者惰性 策略性行为 进入阻止 进入容纳 Consumer inertia Strategic behavior Entry deterrence Entry accommodation
作者简介 应珊珊,女,1989年6月生,上海财经大学上海发展研究院助理研究员,博士,研究方向为行为产业组织理论、互联网经济和反垄断政策;徐幸,女,1989年10月生,上海财经大学商学院博士研究生,研究方向为产业政策、产业结构。
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