摘要
回收再利用已成为企业降低成本、履行社会责任的重要途径。以制造商和零售商组成的动态闭环供应链系统为研究对象,利用微分博弈理论探讨公平关切行为对供应链成员决策的影响。通过构建回收率线性微分方程、供应链成员效用函数及HJB方程,研究制造商公平关切、零售商负责回收废旧产品模式下供应链成员的最优批发价格、最优销售价格和最优利润问题,最后进行参数敏感性分析。结果显示:制造商公平关切程度与系统回收率及零售商回收努力水平成反比,与批发价格和零售价格成正比。
Recycling has become an important way for enterprises to reduce costs and fulfill their social responsibilities.Taking the dynamic closed-loop supply chain system composed of manufacturers and retailers as the research object,the differential game theories are used to explore the influence of fair concern behavior on the decision-making of the supply chain members.By constructing the linear differential equation of recovery rate,the utility function of supply chain members and HJB equation,the optimal wholesale price,the optimal sales price and the optimal profit of supply chain members under the mode of fair concern of manufacturers and responsibility of retailers for recycling waste products are studied.Finally,the parameter sensitivity analysis is carried out.The results show that the fairness concerns of manufacturers are inversely proportional to the system recovery rate and the recovery efforts of retailers,and directly proportional to the wholesale price and retail price.
作者
卢玺
郑晶莹
LU Xi;ZHENG Jing-ying(School of Management,Shenyang University of Technology,Shenyang 110870,China)
出处
《沈阳工业大学学报（社会科学版）》
2020年第1期33-39,共7页
Journal of Shenyang University of Technology(Social Sciences)
基金
辽宁省社会科学规划基金一般项目(L15BJY035)
关键词
制造商
零售商
回收率
HJB方程
闭环供应链
公平关切
微分博弈
参数敏感性
manufacture
retailer
recovery rate
HJB equation
closed-loop supply chain
fairness concern
differential game
parameter sensitivity
作者简介
卢玺(1968-),男,辽宁凤城人,副研究员,博士,主要从事生产系统构造与运作管理等方面的研究。
