公平关切下物流服务供应链质量缺陷承诺策略研究被引量：11

Quality Defect Guarantee Decision in Logistics Service Supply Chain with Fairness Concern

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摘要考虑物流服务供应链中成员的公平关切行为,以Nash讨价还价均衡解作为公平收益参照点,构建Nash讨价还价公平关切下物流服务供应链质量缺陷承诺策略模型,分析和研究公平关切对最优策略、利润和效用的影响。研究结果表明,物流服务质量缺陷承诺水平随着物流服务集成商公平关切系数的增加而减少,却随着物流服务提供商公平关切系数的增加而增加;物流服务订购量随着物流服务集成商公平关切系数的增加而减少,也随着物流服务提供商公平关切系数的增加而减少;当物流服务提供商的公平关切系数增加时,物流服务供应链中各成员的利润和效用以及整体利润和效用都会不断减少;但当物流服务提供商的公平关切程度一定而物流服务集成商的公平关切系数增加时,物流服务供应链中各成员的利润和效用以及整体利润和效用不断提高。 This paper incorporates the supply chain members’ behavior characteristics with fairness concern into logistics service supply chain. The Nash bargaining solution is regarded as the fairness reference point of the supply chain members. A model for service quality defect guarantee decision is established in the logistics service supply chain with Nash bargaining fairness concern. We analyze the impact of fairness concern on the optimal strategies, profits and utilities. The results show that the logistics service quality defect rate guarantee decreases in the fairness concern coefficient of the logistics service integrator, and increases in the fairness concern coefficient of functional logistics service provider;the logistics service quantity decreases with the fairness concern coefficients of logistics services integrator and functional logistics service provider;as the logistics service provider’s fairness concern increases, the expected profits and utilities of two members and the whole supply chain decrease;but given that the fairness concern of functional logistics service provider is at a certain degree, the expected profits and utilities of two members and the whole supply chain increase as the fairness concern of logistics services integrator coefficient increases.

作者杜妮周盛超 DU Ni;ZHOU Sheng-chao(College of Engineering, Hunan Agricultural University,Changsha 410128, China;School of Logistics, Central SouthUniversity of Forestry and Technology, Changsha 410004, China)

机构地区湖南农业大学工学院中南林业科技大学物流学院

出处《运筹与管理》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2019年第7期34-43,共10页 Operations Research and Management Science

基金国家自然科学基金资助项目(71671188) 湖南省自然科学基金资助项目(2018JJ3891) 湖南省教育厅科学研究项目(18B189)

关键词物流服务供应链公平关切质量缺陷承诺 Nash讨价还价博弈 logistics service supply chain fairness concern quality defect guarantee Nash bargaining game

分类号 C934 [经济管理—管理学] F253 [经济管理—国民经济]

作者简介杜妮(1985-),女,湖南长沙人,博士研究生,研究方向:物流服务供应链决策优化;通讯作者:周盛超(1987-),男,湖南衡阳人,讲师,研究方向:供应链管理。