摘要
股权融资激活了成长型企业协同供应链上下游捕获发展机会的能力,而基于市场套利定价理论的估值未能缓解投融资双方不断涌现的估值冲突,使得股权融资的合理估值探索显得愈发迫切.因此,为刻画供应链与博弈新视角下的股权投融资本质特征,构建了零售商股权融资模型,分析了新战略视角下缓和估值冲突的合作共赢空间,进一步探讨了股权融资战略中合理估值存在性,核心研究发现是,零售商股权融资中存在能协调各参与方利益的"合作估值区间"与最优估值,且最优估值受零售商在供应链结构地位的影响.
Equity financing activated the ability of the upstream and downstream of collaboration supply chains of growth-type enterprises to capture opportunities for development.However,the arbitrage pricing theory could not alleviate the conflict of valuation between the investment and financing sides,which makes it more urgent to explore a reasonable valuation of equity financing.This paper depicts the essential characteristics of supply chains and game theory in a new perspective,constructs a retailer equity financing model and analyzes the cooperative and win-win situation to mitigate the valuation conflict.In addition,the paper also discusses the existence of a reasonable valuation in equity financing.The key finding is that there exists a“cooperative valuation interval”and an optimal valuation.At the same time,the optimal valuation is affected by the retailer in supply chain structure.
作者
于辉
李鑫
YU Hui;LI Xin(School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400030,China)
出处
《管理科学学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2018年第9期91-104,共14页
Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571024
71872021)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(15YJA630058
14YJA630087)
关键词
股权融资
最优估值
供应链视角
零售商
equity financing
optimal valuation
supply chain perspective
retailer
作者简介
于辉(1973—),男,重庆人,博士,教授,博士生导师.Email:yuhui@cqu.edu.cn.
