摘要
"宜兴冷冻胚胎继承纠纷案"一审判决从胚胎和其上权利的不可继承性否定了原告对涉案胚胎的继承权。这一裁判在逻辑上是自洽的,却忽略了社会变迁对司法的需求,未能很好地回应社会变迁中民众的诉求。二审法院转而从多个角度论证死者父母对胚胎享有共同的监管与处置权的正当性,揭示了胚胎在法律属性上的多维可能,对类似案件的处理具有一定的参考价值。但二审法院并未能够揭示死者父母享有此等权利的真正原因。此权利并非依据继承法取得,而是基于在伦理和血缘上的亲近关系而原始取得的"准亲权"。法律应该扩大收养对象的范围,将以生育为目的的人体外胚胎纳入收养范围。
The legal attribute of the human embryos for fertility is the object of quasi-parental rights.The first-instance judgment of the inheritance disputes of the frozen embryos in Yixing rejected the right of inheritance of the parents of the dead to the remaining embryos form two aspects:first,the embryos in the case can't be inherited,secondly,the limited rights of dead on the embryos can't be inherited either.This judgment is logic self-consistency,but it ignored the response to the social change.The second-instance judgment avoided the inherit-ability of the embryos involved.In fact it demonstrated the legitimacy of litigants to the embryos involved from multiple dimensions.This judgment has reference value to the similar cases.But it failed to reveal the real reason why the litigants enjoy a common regulation and disposition to the remaining embryos.In fact the litigants' rights to the embryos is primitive acquisition other than derivative acquisition,therefore this case is not an inheritance case.Embryos of this type should be included the scope of the adoptee when the Adoption Laws are modified in the near future.
出处
《财经法学》
2015年第2期69-82,共14页
Law and Economy
关键词
体外胚胎
胚胎继承
准亲权
in vitro embryo
embryo heritage
quasi-parental rights
