摘要
国有混合所有制经营绩效受高管激励的影响,而高管激励方式主要由固定薪酬和股权激励组成。倒U型假说的数理推导结论能有效反映高管激励与经营绩效的曲线关系。文章通过数据检验证明,三种不同条件下国有混合所有制企业的高管激励与经营绩效之间存在不同的U型曲线关系。第一,只拿固定薪酬的高管激励与经营绩效之间呈倒U型曲线关系,固定薪酬在短期内对经营绩效有明显的提升作用;第二,只拿股权激励的高管激励与经营绩效之间呈正U型曲线关系,股权激励对经营绩效的影响系数比固定薪酬低,但对经营绩效的长期发展有利;第三,既拿固定薪酬又拿股权激励的混合高管激励与经营绩效之间呈无规律的线性曲线关系。
The business performance of state-owned mixed ownership enterprise is influenced by executive incentive, which is mainly composed of fixed salary and equity incentive. The mathematical deduction of the inverted U-type hypothesis can effectively reflect the curve relationship between executive stimulation and the business performance. This paper presents data test proof to demonstrate that there exist different U-shaped curves between the executive incentive and the business performance of the state-owned mixed ownership enterprises under three different conditions. Firstly, there is a inverted U-shaped curve relationship between the business performance and the incentive for executives with fixed pay, and the fixed compensation has a significant effect on enterprise performance in the short term; secondly, there is a positive U-shaped curve relationship between the business performance and the incentive for the executive only with equity incentive, and the influence coefficient of equity incentive on enterprise effect is lower than fixed salary, but it is favorable for the long-term development of the enterprise business performance; thirdly, the curves are irregular of the business performance and the mixed incentives for executive with fixed salary and the equity incentive.
作者
阿布都合力力·阿布拉
Abuduhelili·abula(School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong Xinjiang University of Finance ＆ University, Beijing 100044, China;School of Accounting, Economics, Urumqi 830012, China)
出处
《统计与决策》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第9期172-176,共5页
Statistics & Decision
基金
新疆维吾尔自治区社会科学基金青年项目(2015CJY017)
作者简介
阿布都合力力·阿布拉（1983-），男，新疆库车人，博士研究生，副教授，研究方向：国有企业改革。
