摘要
资产证券化的动机错向问题被认为是导致2007年金融危机的重要原因。在危机之后资产证券化监管改革中,美国、欧盟确立了风险自留规则,以此促进发起人、发起主体在资产证券化中执行严格的基础资产发放标准。同期,中国也确立了资产证券化风险自留规则,但是与美国、欧盟相比,其规则过于简单、原则,难以实现风险自留的监管目标。基于美国、欧盟的监管经验以及中国实际,应当从提升立法层级、明确风险自留豁免及减缓条件等六个方面完善中国的资产证券化风险自留规则。
The problem of incentives misalignment in the securitization process is considered to be one of the most im- portant causes that lead to the 2007 financial crisis. In the post--crisis financial regulatory reform of seeuritization, both of U nited States and European Union have established requirement for risk attention related to securitization, in order to assure the originators and sponsor of securitization to hold robust underlying assets underwriting standard. During the same period, China adopted risk attention requirement too, but compared to United States and European Union, our rules are too simple and fun- damental. Based on the legislative experience of United States and European Union and the securitization market reality of Chi- na, it needs to improve Chings risk attention requirements from six dimensions, including escalating the legislative manner and defining the specific condition for risk attention exempt and alleviate.
出处
《法学评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第5期155-162,共8页
Law Review
关键词
资产证券化
风险自留
监管改革
Asset Securitization
Risk Attention
Regulatory Reform
作者简介
西南政法大学博士研究生。
