摘要
分析了不完全信息下,拥有提高产品质量技术的创新企业,在(非)排他性授权策略下,向进行Cournot竞争生产低质量产品的生产企业技术授权的契约优化问题。研究表明,在排他性授权策略下,双重收费契约下信息不完全能使接受授权生产企业赢取更多的创新企业特许权补贴;在非排他性授权策略下,不完全信息能够削弱创新企业通过双重收费契约设计对产品间接市场的垄断程度。在排他性授权交易下,信息不完全使特许权收费契约优于固定收费契约成为可能,这不同于Li and Wang的研究结论。基于提高社会创新能力视角,政府应鼓励创新企业更多采用特许权收费授权契约,削弱信息不对称的影响,赢取更多研发投资利润回报。
Under incomplete information,this paper studies the mechanism of licensing contracts where a non-producing innovator sells its quality-improving technology to the producers which compete in Cournot market.The innovator can choose exclusive or non-exclusive licensing strategy.It finds that,in the exclusive licensing,under two-part tariff contract incomplete information makes the innovator give more royalty subsidy to the licensee.However,in the non-exclusive licensing,incomplete weakens the degree of monopoly which is induced by the two-part tariff contract offered by the licensor.Incomplete information makes it possible that the royalty contract can be better than fixed-fee contract under exclusive licensing strategy,which is different with Li and Wang.To improve the social innovation ability,the government should encourage the licenser to choose royalty contract,which can weaken the influence of incomplete information.
出处
《科技进步与对策》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第4期14-22,共9页
Science & Technology Progress and Policy
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71402158)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(12YJC790185)
山东省社会科学规划研究项目(12CJJZ07
14CJJJ08
15CJJJ27)
作者简介
王君美（1974-）,女,山东招远人,博士,烟台大学经济管理学院副教授,研究方向为产业组织理论及应用、技术经济及管理.
