摘要
考虑1个供应商和1个零售商组成的两级生鲜农产品供应链,其中2个成员的决策过程是一个Stackelberg博弈。市场需求依赖零售商的努力水平,零售商在供应商给定批发价的条件下确定最优销售价格,包括折扣前价格和折扣后价格,供应商在预知零售商最优定价的条件下确定最优批发价。为实现供应链的利润最大化,引入收益共享契约,结果表明,当收益共享契约满足一定条件时,可以实现供应商、零售商以及供应链整体的帕累托改进。最后,通过数值分析,表明零售商、供应商以及供应链的利润随着努力水平的提高而递增。同时发现,初始新鲜度的提高以及折扣价格敏感系数的降低都有助于零售商利润的提高。
Considering a two-echelon fresh agriculture product supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer, whose decision-making process can be regarded as a Stackelberg game. The market demand relies on efforts level. The retailer sets optimal retail price, including price before and after discount, after the supplier offers the wholesale price. Then, the supplier determines the optimal price. In order to maximize the supply chain profit, we introduce the revenue sharing contract. The analysis indicates that when the revenue sharing contract satisfies certain conditions, the supplier, the retailer and the overall supply chain can achieve Pareto improvement. Through numerical analysis, we find that the profit of the retailer, the supplier and the supply chain increase with the increase of effort level. Meanwhile, the increase of initial freshness and the decrease of discount price sensitive coefficient contributes to the improvement of retailer＇s profit.
出处
《系统管理学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第1期142-153,共12页
Journal of Systems & Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71101054
71572058)
华南理工大学中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(2015ZZ057)
关键词
努力水平
收益共享
定价
生鲜农产品供应链
effort level
revenue sharing
pricing
fresh agricultural product supply chain
作者简介
杨磊（1979-），男，博士，教授。研究方向为农产品物流与供应链风险管理。E-mail：yang@seut．edu．cn
