摘要
亏损的在位国有企业退出,如果参与者没有契约性沉淀成本和生产要素沉淀成本,那么企业会自由退出市场。然而,当有契约性沉淀成本和生产要素沉淀成本时,我们会发现,政府所有者只要获得正准租金,他便不会退出市场。由于契约性沉淀成本和生产要素沉淀成本,一旦退出市场这些利益无法得到相应的补偿,因此政府所有者会采取各种经济政策追求准租金最大化,直到准租金减少为零或负,他才会放弃国有产权。这样我们从沉淀成本角度内生地解释在位国企退出方式的选择,恰恰是政府所有者追求自身收入最大化的结果。
If zero sunk costs by changes in contractual arrangement and factors of produc- tion,the lost existing SOEs'state owners freely exit the market,however,because of positive sunk costs,we will find sunk costs not only impede the market-exit of the SOEs'state owners and contract termination,but also affect non-market-exit for the state owners to pursue the maximum quasi-rents until null or negative quasi-rents,including discounted present value of expected quasi- rents.When there is no quasi-rents,state ownership is given up.
出处
《产业经济评论（山东）》
2002年第2期125-137,共13页
Review of Industrial Economics
关键词
契约性沉淀成本
生产要素沉淀成本
市场退出
政府所有权退出
Sunk Costs by Changes in Contractual Arrangement
Sunk Costs by Production Factor Mobility
Market Exit
State-Ownership Exit
