节税驱动下的期权行权日操纵行为及其经济后果研究被引量：6

The Research on the Manipulation of Option Exercise Date Under the Drive of Tax Saving

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摘要本文对高管在最小化股票期权薪酬个人所得税驱动下的股票期权行权日操纵行为进行研究。以2006年至2014年底实施股票期权激励的全部184次非自主统一行权为研究对象,通过事件研究法,我们找到了行权日位于股价低位的经验证据,并发现该操纵行为是通过事后的倒签行权日而非事前的信息披露时间操纵股价实现。最小化股票期权激励的个人所得税是高管倒签股票期权行权日的驱动因素,潜在的节税收益越大,股票期权行权日被倒签的可能性越大。控股股东和高管的权力越大,股票期权行权日被倒签的可能性也越大;董事会特别是其下设薪酬考核委员会的独立性能抑制倒签行为的发生;而机构投资者治理不能对倒签行为进行有效约束。进一步的研究表明,股票期权行权日的倒签行为会损害公司的价值,在股票期权成本费用可以在企业所得税前列支的规定出台后,高管会通过真实经营活动活动和真实投资活动盈余管理掩盖其倒签股票期权行权日导致的公司所得税现金流出损失。 Using the sample of 184 executive exercise stock options from 2006 to 2014, we find the empirical evidence that the exercise date of executives stock option was backdated to the days when the stock price was at the lower point. Further regression analysis showed that the greater the potential tax saving benefits, the greater the likelihood of backdating, and the higher the power of control shareholder and executives, the more likelihood of backdating is. Moreover, the higher the independence of the Board, especially the Remuneration and Appraisal Committee, the less likelihood of backdating is. However, the governance of the institutional investors can not reduce the likelihood of backdating. This option exercise backdating behavior will damage the firm value, and the executives will use real investment activities and real operation activities manipulation to conceal the decreasing of firm value caused by executives＇ option exercise backdating.

作者杨慧辉潘飞梅丽珍

机构地区上海对外经贸大学会计学院上海财经大学会计学院

出处《中国软科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第1期121-137,共17页 China Soft Science

基金国家自然科学基金重点项目"以价值为基础以战略为导向的中国企业管理会计研究"(71032005) 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"上市公司股权激励中的高管机会主义行为研究"(13YJC630201) 上海市哲学社会科学规划课题"大股东-高管权力博弈股权激励与公司非效率性投资行为研究"(编号2015BGL004) "上海市高校085工程项目高原高峰学科"的资助

关键词行权日倒签个人所得税最小化信息披露操纵经济后果 Option exercise backdating Minimization personal income tax of option Information manipulation Economic Consequences

分类号 F276 [经济管理—企业管理]

作者简介杨慧辉（1980-），女，四川西昌人，上海对外经贸大学会计学院副教授，硕士生导师，博士，研究方向：公司治理。

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