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基于重复博弈的Ad Hoc网络节点惩罚机制研究

Research of Nodes Punishment Mechanism Based on Repeated Game in Ad Hoc Networks
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摘要 在无线Ad Hoc网络中,节点在数据转发过程中可能出现的自私行为将影响网络的可靠性。为了促进节点合作,在特定的网络模型中实现了两种已有的惩罚机制。创新点是从节点收益的角度观察机制下的网络的稳定性,分析贴现因子对网络总收益的影响和各种参数对网络收敛的影响,并对此设计了4组仿真实验(上述几点在原文献中并未着重讨论)。仿真结果证明,上述机制能够降低自私节点的收益,有效地促进了节点的合作转发,维护了网络的稳定。 In wireless Ad Hoc networks, the nodes, which may cause selfish behaviors in the process of data forwarding, should affect the reliability of networks. In order to promote the cooperation of nodes, this paper achieves two kinds of existed punishment mechanisms in a particular network model. The innovation point of this paper is that it observes the stability of the networks which is under mechanism from the perspective of nodes' payoffs, and analyses the influences of discount factors bringing to network total revenue and the affects of different parameters bringing to networks convergence. Moreover, four groups of simulation experiments are designed(These points are not discussed deeply in the original paper). The simulation results show that these mechanisms can reduce the payoffs of selfish nodes, effectively promote nodes to forward in the cooperative way, maintain the stability of the networks.
机构地区 重庆通信学院
出处 《电视技术》 北大核心 2015年第22期112-116,共5页 Video Engineering
基金 重庆市自然科学基金项目(cstc2014jcyj A40051)
关键词 无线AD HOC网络 惩罚机制 重复博弈 纳什均衡 wireless Ad Hoc networks punishment mechanism repeated game Nash equilibrium
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