摘要
引入消费者对可追溯食品的支付意愿,利用博弈论分析不同决策情形下二级可追溯食品供应链中销售商和食品加工企业的最优策略。研究结果表明:在分散决策情形下,销售商在静态博弈均衡时不分担食品加工企业实施可追溯的成本,而是通过加大补贴力度激励食品加工企业提高食品的可追溯水平;在斯坦克尔伯格均衡时,销售商将选择对自己有利的成本分担比例和价格补贴系数的组合策略;基于Rubinstein讨价还价模型的收益共享契约则有助于激励各方实施食品安全可追溯机制。
Considering the consumer preference,the Game theory is used to analyze the strategies for the retailers and the food processing enterprises to implement traceability in two-stage supply chain in different relationships and different status. The results show that,in the case of decentralized decision-making,the retailers in the static game equilibrium will not share implementation costs of traceability with the food processing enterprises,but will increase traceability subsidies to motivate the enterprises to improve the level of traceability,while in Stackelberg equilibrium,the retailers will choose the favorable strategy combination involving the ratios of implementation cost and price subsidies,which can achieve the same incentive effect; in the case of centralized decision-making,the revenue sharing contract based on Rubinstein bargaining model can motivate the parties to collaborate in traceability.
出处
《南京邮电大学学报（社会科学版）》
2015年第1期44-48,共5页
Journal of Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Science Edition)
基金
南京邮电大学校项目"基于信息传递的食品安全协调与激励研究"(NY213192)
江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金"ICT促进行业减排的激励政策研究"(2012SJB630049)
南京邮电大学引进人才基金"电信基础设施共建共享激励与协调机制研究"(NYS211011)
关键词
收益共享
支付意愿
追溯机制
食品供应链
食品安全
revenue sharing
willingness to pay
retrospective mechanism
food supply chain
food safety
作者简介
巩永华，讲师，博士，研究方向：供应链管理和激励机制。
薛殿中，硕士研究生，研究方向：食品安全舆情。
仲凯旋，硕士研究生，研究方向：供应链管理。
