摘要
随着大股东持股比例的上升，究竟会导致大股东更有动力监督管理层，并降低其掏空动机，还是更有能力掏空上市公司、损害中小投资者的利益呢？为此，本文以2003～2012年中国A股上市公司为样本，考察了大股东持股比例对股价崩盘风险的影响。研究发现，随着第一大股东持股比例的提高，未来股价崩盘风险显著下降；在控制了内生性等问题之后，该结论依然成立。这支持了“监督效应”和“更少掏空效应”，但不支持“更多掏空效应”。进一步分析表明，大股东持股同时通过“监督效应”和“更少掏空效应”影响股价崩盘风险。本文不但深化了股价崩盘风险影响因素研究，而且有助于我们全面认识大股东在公司治理中的角色，对于深入理解大股东在资本市场中的作用，以及如何防范股价崩盘，促进资本市场健康有序发展都具有重要意义。
ing managers more actively, thereby reduce its motive of tunneling? Or does it has greater ability to tunnel listed com-panies and to damage the interests of small and middle investors? To this end, we have, in this paper, taken as speci-men China's A-share listed companies between 2003 and 2010, to investigate the effect of the LS's proportion ofshareholding on the risks of the stock price crash. By our study, we have discovered that, with the increase of the pro-portion of shareholding made by the first LS, the risk of the future crash of the stock price will obviously decrease, andthat, after the problems such as the nature of being internal has been controlled, the above-mentioned conclusion isstill correct. This has supported'the supervision effect'and'still less tunneling effect', but it has not supported'more tunneling effect. Our further analysis indicates that the shareholding of the LS has impacted on the risks of thecrash of the stock price by means of'the effect of monitoring'and'still less effect of tunneling, but this conclusiondoes not support'more tunneling effect'. Our further analysis indicates that has impacted on the risk of the crash ofthe stock price by'the effect of the monitoring and'still less tunneling effect'. In this paper, we have not only deep-ened the study on the influencing factors of the risks of the crash of the stock price, but also this paper is helpful toour completely recognize the role of the LS in the management of the company. This paper has important significancefor how to deeply understand the effect of the LS on the capital market, and how to guard against the crash of the stockprice, and for promoting the healthy and well organized development of the capital market.
出处
《管理世界》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第2期45-57,187,共13页
Journal of Management World
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(项目批准号:71372162
71432008
71472002)对本文的资助
作者简介
叶康涛为本文通讯作者.
