期刊文献+

引入时间收益的空间公共品博弈在反省机制下的仿真分析 被引量:2

Simulation Analysis of Spatial public Goods Games with Time-rewarding under the Self-questioning Mechanism
原文传递
导出
摘要 在现实中,提前完成工作的奖励机制被经常采用,通过提前完成工作节省时间得到的贴现效应能够促进社会系统更好地合作。通过构建时间收益w-w/nC来反映这种时间的贴现效应,其中nC是一个博弈群中合作者的数量,w是一个时间收益参数。引入时间收益的公共品博弈模型是为了研究当更多的代理人愿意合作使任务提前完成而得到的时间效益在反省机制下对博弈演化的影响。演化结果表明,当w>0时,时间效益在乘法因子r的一个很宽的范围能明显的促进合作。尤其是对于较小的r,在w增长的初始阶段,存在一个"冰冻区间"使得系统的合作水平fc持续在最低值,但是当w接近一个阈值wc,合作水平开始迅速增加。最后,研究噪声对演化过程的影响。 The incentive effects of finishing the work in advance are often employed in reality, likewise, the present discounted effect of the future profits by finishing the work sooner can also promote the cooperative level. The time-rewarding form vo -- w/nc was constructed to reflect the present discounted profits where nc hints the number of cooperators in a game group and zo stands for a time-rewarding parameters. The modified public goods games (PGG) with time-rewarding are generalized to study the effect of additional time benefit resulting from earlier completing of a task when more agents willing to share the work. The results in the self-questioning mechanism (SM) indicate that for w^0, the time-rewarding can apparently promote the cooperation over a wide range of the multiply factor r. Particularly for some smaller r, at the beginning of the growth in zo, there exists a "frozen interval" so that the cooperation frequency fc wanders at the lowest level, but when w closes to a threshold value we, the cooperation level fc begin to increase rapidly. Finally, the impact of noise value on the evolution is studied.
出处 《系统工程》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2014年第2期117-122,共6页 Systems Engineering
基金 国家自然基金资助项目(61070169)
关键词 公共品博弈 时间效益 自我反省 Public Goods Games Time-rewardingt Self-questioning
作者简介 冯瑞雪,女,河南安阳人,研究生,研究方向:社会网络。 张宏斌:zhanghb@suda.edu.cn。
  • 相关文献

参考文献2

二级参考文献40

  • 1Colman A M. Game Theory and its Applications in the Social and Biological Science[ M]. Oxford:Butterworth Heinemann,1995.
  • 2Axelrod R, Hamilton W D. The evolution of cooperation[ J ]. Science, 1981,211 : 1390 - 1396.
  • 3Szabo G, Hauert C. Phase Transitions and Volunteering in Spatial Public Goods Games [ J ]. Phys Rev Lett, 2002,89:118101-1 - 118101-4.
  • 4Abramson G, Kuperman M. Social games in a social network [ J ]. Phys Rev E ,2001,63:030901-1 -030901-4.
  • 5Ebel H, Bornholdt S. Coevolutionary games on networks [ J ]. Phys Rev E ,2002,66:056118-1 - 056118-8.
  • 6Novak M A, May R M. Evolutionary games and spatial chaos[ J]. Nature, 1992,359:826 - 829.
  • 7Doebi M, Knowlton N. The evolution of interspecific mutualisms[ J]. Proc Natl Acad USA, 1998,95:8676 - 8680.
  • 8Heraut C, Doebi M. Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game [ J ]. Nature,2004,428:643 - 646.
  • 9Kim B J,Trusina A, Holme P, et al. Dynamic instabilities induced by asymmetric influence:Prisoners' dilemma game in small- world networks [ J ]. Phys Rev E ,2002,66:021907-1 - 021907-4.
  • 10Gyorgy S,Vukov J. Cooperation for volunteering and partially random partnerships[ J]. Phys Rev E ,2004,69:036107-1 -036107-7.

共引文献2

同被引文献30

  • 1魏光兴,余乐安,汪寿阳,黎建强.基于协同效应的团队合作激励因素研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2007,27(1):1-9. 被引量:39
  • 2Cooper C E, Hamel S A, Connaughton S L. Motiva-tions and obstacles to networking in a university busi-ness incubator[J]. Journal of Technology Transfer, 2012,37(4):433-453.
  • 3Bellingtoft A. The bottom-up business incubator: Leve-rage to networking and cooperation practices in aself-generated, entrepreneurial-enabled environment [J].Technovation, 2012,32(5):304-315.
  • 4Qian H, Haynes K E, Riggle J D. Incubation push orbusiness pull? Investigating the geography of US busi-ness incubators [J]. Economic Development Quarterly,2011,25(1):79-90.
  • 5Heidi R A, Steensma H K, Phelps C. Divisive fault-lines and the unplanned dissolutions of multipartner allia-nces[J]. Organization Science, 2014,25(5):1351-1371.
  • 6Szolnoki A, Perc M. Effectiveness of conditional pu-nishment for the evolution of public cooperation[J].Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2013,325(10):34-41.
  • 7Schoenmakers S, Hilbe C, Blasius B,et al. Sanctionsas honest signals: The evolution of pool punishmentby public sanctioning institutions[J]. Journal of Theo-retical Biology, 2014,356(100):36-46.
  • 8Zhong W W, Zhao J X, Lian Z Z. Punishment mecha-nism with self-adjusting rules in spatial voluntary pub-lic goods games[J]. Communications in TheoreticalPhysics, 2014,62(5):649-654.
  • 9Li K, Cong R, Wu T, et al. Social exclusion in finitepopulations [J]. Physical Review E,2015,doi:10.1103/PhysRevE.91.042810.
  • 10Helbing D, Szolnoki A,Perc M, et al. Evolutionaryestablishment of moral and double moral standardsthrough spatial interactions [J]. PLOS Computational Bio-logy, 2010,4(4):51-60.

引证文献2

二级引证文献2

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部