摘要
文章从债权人兼股东的角度对日本的主银行制进行了理论研究。第一 ,分析了债权人兼股东、债权人、股东这三个主体的利害关系 ,阐明了债权人兼股东的利益中立性是主银行制存在的前提。第二 ,分析了信息非对称时主银行的信号传递机制及其协作机制 ,并导出了债权人兼股东的性质是主银行发挥其作用的必要保证等结论。
This paper attempts to give a new approach to analyze the Japanese main banks system. It focuses on the function of main banks both as creditors and shareholders.In section I, two models are formalized to distinguish a main bank from an ordinary creditor or a shareholder. These models prove that in the main bank system, conflicts between shareholders and creditors could be safely coordinated. In section II, another model will clarify that firm's financing form the main bank can be an effective and crucial signal for other shareholders or creditors, which is guiding them to cooperate with the main bank in corporate governance and finance.
出处
《北京师范大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2001年第1期55-63,共9页
Journal of Beijing Normal University(Social Sciences)
关键词
主银行
债权者
股东
信号传递
协作机制
main bank
creditor
shareholder
signaling
coordination mechanism
作者简介
任云(1965-),男,湖北省松滋市人,日本樱美林大学产业研究所,特别研究员。
