摘要
随着环境腐败案件的逐渐增多,大众对现存监管制度产生了质疑。经济责任审计具有预防与揭露腐败的功能,笔者根据利益集团与主管领导的策略互动将整个贿赂博弈分为恶意攻击阶段、贿赂阶段、说谎阶段,研究发现除恶意攻击外其他两个阶段均出现了受贿现象。因此,可从这两个阶段的博弈条件出发采取加大经济责任审计处罚力度与增加恶意攻击后领导的声誉奖励来阻止环保贿赂发生。
With the gradual increase in environmental cases of corruption, public questioned the existing regu- latory regime. Economic responsibility audit can prevention and expose corruption, our paper divide whole game in- to a malicious attack phase, bribery stage, lying stage study which according to interest group and competent lead- ership strategic interaction, study found that in addition to malicious attacks outside the other two phases of the phenomenon of bribery occurred. Therefore, we can prevent environmental bribery from increasing the penalties for economic responsibility audit and increasing the reputation of the leadership after malicious attacks.
出处
《中央财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第4期56-65,共10页
Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics
基金
国家社科基金重大课题(11&ZD044)
教育部人文社科青年基金资助项目(13YJC790139)
杭州市哲学社科规划课题(D13GL14)
关键词
经济责任审计
贿赂
声誉
环境项目招投标
Economic responsibility audit Bribery Reputation Environmental project bidding
作者简介
王帆，男，河南人，浙江工商大学财务与会计学院讲师，管理学博士，研究方向为资本市场财务与审计；
张龙平，男，四川人，中南财经政法大学会计学院教授，博士生导师，研究方向为资本市场财务与审计。
