摘要
负债的公司治理作用是公司财务研究的重要问题。已有文献探讨了负债在股权分散公司中的公司治理作用,而在股权集中公司中负债对大股东与中小股东之间的代理问题的影响,已有的经验证据相当有限。本文以我国国有控制权转移上市公司为样本,研究了负债在股权集中公司中的治理作用。研究发现,负债与大股东的利益侵占存在显著正相关关系;相对于国有控股公司来说,私有公司的负债水平更高,其原因在于私有大股东通过负债对中小股东利益的侵占程度高于国有大股东。本文提供了负债与大股东利益侵占之间关系的直接证据,揭示了大股东通过负债侵占中小股东利益的行为,以及所有权性质对大股东通过负债侵占小股东利益行为的影响。
We provide direct evidence on the dark side of leverage and offer new insights regarding the role of debt in corporate governance.Using a sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises that have experienced a transfer of controlling rights,we find a positive and significant relationship between expropriation and debt usage.Firms controlled by private block shareholders tend to have higher leverage due to excessive expropriation via debt.The evidence we document provides fresh insights into the impact of debt on the agency problem between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders,and suggests the presence of expropriation through debt and its conditional effect on corporate ownership.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第4期66-72,96,共7页
Accounting Research
基金
国家社会科学基金(05CJY009)
国家自然科学基金(71025003)的研究成果
