摘要
针对秘密共享中理性参与者的效用函数难以刻画的问题,考虑参与者的信誉值构建了面向秘密共享的信誉机制;通过考虑理性参与者的长远利益和眼前利益,设计了更为合理的效用假设和效用函数,并以此为基础构建了一个新的基于信誉机制的理性秘密共享方案;最后通过博弈分析表明,在理性秘密共享重构阶段,合作是一个严格的占优策略,我们的方案可以有效地促进理性参与者进行合作,产生一个严格的纳什均衡。
In order to solve the problem that the secret sharing rational participants＂ utility function was difficult to describe, considered the participants＇reputation value, a reputation mechanism for secret sharing was presen- ted. Firstly. By considering the long-term interests and immediate interests of rational participants, a more rea- sonable utility assumption and utility function were designed, and then a new rational secret sharing scheme was constructed based on the reputation mechanism. Finally, the game analysis shows that the cooperation is a strict- ly dominant strategy in the rational secret sharing reconstruction phase, and the rational participants can be effec- tive to promote cooperation in the proposed scheme, then a strict Nash equilibrium is produced.
出处
《贵州大学学报（自然科学版）》
2012年第6期76-81,共6页
Journal of Guizhou University:Natural Sciences
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(60963023
61262073)
贵州省自然科学基金项目([2009]2013)
贵州大学博士基金项目(2007-040)
关键词
秘密共享
理性
信誉机制
效用函数
secret sharing
rational
reputation mechanism
utility function
作者简介
徐志聘（1986-），男，福建长泰人，硕士研究生，研究方向：密码学理论与工程，Email：xzp860815@126．com．通讯作者：徐志聘，Email：xzp860815@126．com．
