政治关联、过度投资与公司业绩——基于地方政府行政干预背景被引量：8

Political Connections,Excessive Investment and Corporate Performance——An Empirical Study based on the Background of Local Government's Administrative Intervention

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摘要本文以我国地方控股国有上市公司为研究样本,基于地方政府行政干预的外在制度背景,实证研究检验了地方控股国有上市公司与政府之间的政治关联对企业投资效率及公司业绩的影响。本文主要研究结论为:我国地方控股国有上市公司的政治关联水平对企业的投资效率存在显著的负面影响,地方控股国有企业与政府之间的政治关联水平越强,企业投资效率越低,经营业绩则越差。在地方政府行政干预的外在制度背景下,地方国有企业与地方政府之间的政治关联对企业经营扮演"掠夺之手"的角色。 Using China＇s local state owned listed companies as the research samples,based on the external system background of the local government administrative intervention,this article has empirically studied the political connections of local state owned listed companies will bring about what impact to the company＇s investment efficiency and corporate performance.The main research conclusion of this paper is that the political connection level of China＇s local state owned listed companies has a significant negative impact on the company＇s investment efficiency and corporate performance.Under the external system background of the local government administrative intervention,the political connections of local state owned listed companies plays the role as the＂grabbing hand＂.

作者郝君富

机构地区对外经济贸易大学

出处《工业技术经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第12期123-134,共12页 Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

基金对外经济贸易大学2011年度青年教师科研启动项目"政治关联董事会结构与公司业绩"(项目编号为:11QD15)的阶段性研究成果

关键词政治关联过度投资公司业绩地方政府行政干预 political connections excessive investment corporate performance local government＇s administrative intervention

分类号 F830.59 [经济管理—金融学]

作者简介郝君富，对外经济贸易大学保险经济学院讲师。经济学博士。研究方向：公司金融。

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参考文献23

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