交叉上市、治理环境与上市公司超额现金价值被引量：13

Cross-listing,Governance Environment and the Value of Excess Cash Holding of Listed Companies

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摘要从超额现金持有价值的角度,将治理环境和治理约束的改变引入到公司治理与公司价值的研究框架中。以1998年至2011年中国A股上市公司的非平衡面板数据为研究对象,采用Dittmar等提出的公司超额现金持有量估计方法,在回归方程中加入交叉上市的虚拟变量,对比分析A股与AB股、AH股以及发行ADR企业所处治理环境的不同对超额现金持有价值的影响。实证结果表明,中国上市公司的超额现金持有普遍存在折价现象;只在A股市场上市的企业超额现金资产的边际价值为负;既在A股市场上市同时又在B股市场或H股市场交叉上市的企业,超额现金资产的折价程度降低,且私有上市公司的折价降低程度更加明显。上述结果表明严格的治理环境和治理约束有助于改善公司治理和降低现金资产折价;中国的A股上市公司,特别是私有公司,可以通过交叉上市增加外部治理约束降低现金资产的折价程度,提升公司价值。 From the prospect of the value of excess cash holding, the change of governance environment and constraint is introduced into the research framework of corporate governance and corporate value. Taking the imbalance panel data as the research target, the estimate method of excess cash holding suggested by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith is used and dummy variables of crosslisting are put into the regression equation, comparing and analyzing the different governance environment effect of A share ,AB share ,AH share and ADR share on the value of excess cash holding. The empirical analysis found that there is a value discount of the excess cash holding in all listed companies; only A share listed companies, the marginal value of excess cash holding is negative; for those cross-listing companies which both listed in the A share market and the B shares or H shares market, the degree of value discount of excess cash holding is reduced, and the reduced discount degree of private listed companies is more obvious than other. These results show that the governance environment and constraint has an important effect on the corporate governance and decreasing the discount degree of cash holding. For A share listed companies in China, especially private listed companies, can use the method of cross-listing to reduce the discount degree cash holding and increase the firm value by improving external governance constraint.

作者曹森

机构地区北京大学光华管理学院

出处《管理科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第4期31-43,共13页 Journal of Management Science

关键词交叉上市治理环境超额现金价值公司治理 cross-listing governance environment value of excess cash holding corporate governance

分类号 F275 [经济管理—企业管理]

作者简介作者简介：曹森（1984-），男，河南南阳人，北京大学光华管理学院博士研究生，研究方向：公司金融与金融中介等。E—mail：caosen@pku．edu．cn.

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