摘要
报酬契约是所有者激励经营者努力工作的基本方法,其传统做法是将经营者报酬与企业业绩进行直接挂钩,而企业业绩产出本身具有多源性特点——除来自经营者的个人努力外,还与行业结构、资源特征与经营者能力等显著相关。基于上述观点,本文引入了横纵向两维度的相对业绩与经营者能力变量,重构报酬契约模型,并运用委托代理理论进行约束条件下的求解,分析出的结论对企业集团完善报酬契约的设计具有现实借鉴意义。
The compensation contract is always used by owner as an essential method for motivating operator to work hard,and its traditional pattern is tying operator’s pay with enterprise performance directly.However,the enterprise performance itselfs is polygenetic-not only depending on operators’ efforts,but also significantly correlating with industry structure,the characteristics of resources and ability of operators.Based on this view,this paper intoduces relative performance in vertical and horizontal dimension as well as ability of operator,then reconstructs the compensation contract’s model,and finds a solution in the constraints of the principal-agent theory.The final conclusion has important practical significance for the enterprise group to design a more appropriate compensation contract.
出处
《系统工程》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2012年第4期75-80,共6页
Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金委青年科学基金资助项目(70802058)
教育部博士点基金新教师基金资助项目(200803581007)
国家自然科学基金委创新研究群体项目(70821001)
安徽省自然科学基金委第五批优秀青年科技基金资助项目(10040606Y35)
关键词
报酬契约
相对业绩
委托代理模型
利润分享系数
Compensation Contract
Relative Performance
Principal-agent Model
Profit-sharing Coefficient
作者简介
罗彪（1978-），男，安徽毫州人，中国科学技术大学管理学院副教授，研究方向：管理控制，战略管理，绩效管理。
