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英、德电信监管机构制度选择

Institutional Choice of Telecommunication Regulatory Authorities in Britain and Germany
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摘要 20世纪80年代欧洲国家在公用事业部门纷纷建立监管机构。对此一些学者认为,监管机构的建立是政府角色从积极型向监管型转型所必须的制度要件,一个统一的监管机构模式正在形成。从英、德两国电信监管机构的选择可以发现,英、德两国电信监管制度选择的结果和过程既具有很大的相似性,也存在较多的差异。相似性表现在监管机构模式的选择结果和内、外两种力量影响的选择过程;差异性表现在内、外影响程度不同所导致的监管机构内部组织设计上。这种差异源于两国的公共行政传统,因此实现政策学习与传统继承之间的良好结合,对于公用事业改革的成功意义重大。 Most European countries have established national regulatory authority(NRA)in public utilities since the early 1980s.Some political economists argue that the creation of regulatory authority is an institutional prerequisite for functional change in the role of the state from the positive to the regulatory,and predict a relatively unitary NRA model is emerging.Based on the study of institutional choice of telecommunication regulatory authorities in Britain and Germany,this paper shows the similarity and difference between result and process of institutional choice in two regulators.The similarity is embodied on a macro-organizational structure and choice process driven by exterior and internal forces,and difference is represented in internal organizational design affected by exterior and internal forces in a different degree.The different administrative traditions between the two countries result in the difference between regulators.Therefore,in order to reform public utilities it is of importance to link policy-learning with path-dependence well.
作者 张庆才
出处 《厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第2期133-140,共8页 Journal of Xiamen University(A Bimonthly for Studies in Arts & Social Sciences)
基金 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目"监管影响评估:理论与实务"(ZK1009)
关键词 英国 德国 电信监管机构 政策学习 路径依赖 Britain Germany telecommunication regulatory authority policy-learning path dependence
作者简介 张庆才,男,安徽合肥人,厦门大学公共事务学院助理教授,管理学博士。
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参考文献30

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