摘要
本文分析了我国乳业产业链中奶农、奶站、乳制品企业和政府监管部门之间的博弈行为。研究表明:存在信息不对称时,奶农有生产低质量原奶的激励;奶农向奶站供应原奶时易发生柠檬市场问题;奶站有机会向乳制品企业供应不合格原奶;政府监管不力是乳制品企业选择向市场流入不安全乳制品的一个重要原因。对政府监管部门给予相应的额外收益并加大对其监管不力的惩罚力度,迫使上游各方增加私人信息的搜寻成本是解决乳业产业链问题的突破点。
This paper analyzed the actions among milk farmers, milk stations, dairy producers and government supervising department in the dairy supply chain in China. The resuh showed that if the information was asymmetry, milk farmers were encouraged to supply raw milk; and then milk stations had opportunities to supply dairy producers with unqualified raw milk and one important reason for dairy producers supplying unsecured dairy products was government＇ s weak supervision. To solve the problems exiting in the dairy supply chain, government should give supervising department some extra benefits as well as strengthen the punishment dynamics when it worked irresoonsiblv.
出处
《农业经济与管理》
2012年第1期71-78,84,共9页
Agricultural Economics and Management
关键词
乳业产业链
信息不对称
风险转嫁
政府监管
dairy supply chain
information asymmetry
risk transfer
government supervision
作者简介
何安华（1985-），男，博士研究生，研究方向：农业经济管理、产业经济等。
