摘要
在条件风险估值的风险度量准则下,建立了随机弹性需求条件下基于收益共享契约的供应链决策模型,分析了集权供应链系统以及分权供应链系统中风险规避零售商与风险规避供应商的最优决策行为,并进一步探讨了随机需求变量服从均匀分布时集权与分权供应链系统的最优决策研究结果表明集权供应链系统的最优库存因子随整个供应链风险规避度的减小而减小,而整个供应链的风险规避度对最优销售价格的影响则与随机需求变量的分布函数有关.分权供应链系统中的最优库存因子则仅与零售商的风险规避度有关,而最优零售价格受零售商的风险规避度、收益共享系数和批发价格等因素的共同影响.另外,研究还发现分权供应链系统的最优收益共享系数受各成员企业的风险规避度的影响,即零售商越害怕风险或供应商越不害怕风险.分权供应链系统的最优收益共享系数则越大.但数值分析结果却表明在绝大多数情形下收益共享契约机制并不能完美协调此类分权供应链系统.
The supply chain system model is proposed based on revenue sharing policy under stochastic elastic demand. In a conditional value-at-risk framework, the optimal decision making behavior of centralized supply chain and risk-averse supplier and risk-averse retailer under decentralized supply chain are analyzed. Further, given that the random component of demand follows a uniform distribution, we study on the optimal decisions under decentralized and centralized supply chain systems respectively. The, results show that the lower the centralized supply chain＇s risk-aversion, which is also related to the optimal retail price and random demand, the lower the optimal stocking factor. Secondly, the optimal stoeking factor is only related to the risk aversion of retailer, but the optimal retail price also related to the optimal revenue sharing coefficient and trade price. In addition, the risk aversion of supply chain memt）ers aftected the optimal revenue sharing coefficient, but the results determine that in most cases the revenue sharing contract can＇t coordinate this kind of decentralized supply chain system perfectly.
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2011年第12期2296-2307,共12页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
国家自然科学基金(70971042
71001041
71172075)
广东省高等学校人文社会科学创新团队项目(08JDTDXM63002)
华南理工大学中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(2011SG003)
作者简介
林强（19s5－），男，四川内江人，博士研究生；
通讯作者：叶飞（1974－），男，江西进贤县人，博士，教授．博士生导师、研究方向：物流与供应链管理。
