摘要
本文以股改后的解禁股份出售事件为研究对象,考察这一过程中的内幕交易与大股东侵害问题。研究发现,大股东在解禁股份交易中具有显著的择时能力,表现为通过出售股份赚取了超常收益、也及时规避了损失;股东对上市公司的控制力有助增强其择时能力,但由于信息优势在"主动型"内幕交易和"被动型"内幕交易中的不对称作用,只有控制力较强的股东才更有可能及时规避损失;股东关系有助于弥补控制力的不足,在与公司控股股东关系密切的情况下,控制力较弱股东也能在股份交易中及时规避损失。研究从股东控制力和股东关系两个角度,较为全面地分析了大股东侵害的可能途径;研究发现为思考全流通背景下的大股东侵害问题提出了新思路,也为加强对解禁股份的交易监管提供了理论依据。
This paper investigates the insider trading and tunneling during the sales of originally non-tradable shares.After equity division reform,the originally non-tradable shareholders can sell their shares in the secondary market freely.Since these shareholders have controlling rights to the companies and the investors＇ law protection of China is weak,originally non-tradable shareholders would be the insiders during the sales of the originally non-tradable shares.And the insider trading would be the new form of tunneling in the full circulation.Accordingly,this paper investigates the sales of originally non-tradable shares to identify if there is insider trading in the transaction and if minority investors＇ interests are eroded.The find-ings are as follows：Firstly,during the sales of originally non-tradable shares,the originally non-tradable shareholders＇ ability of timing is dominant,they not only earn the abnormal return but also avoid the possible losses in timely way;Secondly,the controlling rights enhance shareholders＇ timing ability.Since the importance of information advantage to active insider trading and to passive insider trading is asymmetric,information advantage is crucial to the former,the stronger controlling rights shareholders hold the more active insider trading would happen.In other words,the block holders are more likely to avoiding loss through sales of originally non-tradable shares;Thirdly,when the controlling rights are weak,the shareholders are more likely to be engaged in passive insider trading,but if the relationship with the controlling shareholders is close,these shareholders will also devote themselves to active insider trading.This finding means relationship with the controlling shareholders would make up for the weak controlling rights.Tunneling is prevalent and dominant in China＇s stock market,but insider trading is a new form after equity division reform.Different from related parties＇ transaction,insider trading is financial transaction and will destroy the confidence of minority investors in stock market.This paper demonstrates the existences of insider trading during the sales of originally non-tradable shares and the timing ability of block holders.The finds are meaningful to the future regulation of the sales of originally non-tradable shares and the regulation of China＇s stock market.
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第4期90-99,共10页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71002044
70972075)资助
作者简介
作者简介蔡宁，厦门大学管理学院副教授、博士，研究方向为资本市场会计与财务
