摘要
在分析林权抵押贷款风险来源的基础上,运用博弈论的基本方法,构建林权抵押贷款的博弈模型,通过模拟借贷双方的客观情况及其行为决策过程,分析金融机构开展林权抵押贷款业务的违约风险及影响因素。模型分析结果表明:贷款额度越大,违约风险越大;贷款利率越高,违约风险越大;给予借款人的违约记录惩罚越大,贷款违约风险越小;抵押物价值的保全将有助于减小贷款的违约风险。
Based on the basic methods of Game Theory,this paper analyzed the sources of default risk in forest right mortgage loan,and simulated the situation between financial institutions and borrowers.It also built a game model to analysis the factors of forest right mortgage loan default risk.The model results showed that the greater the loan amount and the higher of lending rates,the greater of the default risk.The greater punishment of the borrower＇s credit history,the smaller risk of the loan default.In addition,the preservation of the value of collateral should reduce the default risk.
出处
《广东农业科学》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2011年第16期209-211,共3页
Guangdong Agricultural Sciences
关键词
商业银行
林农
抵押贷款
博弈
林权
commercial banks
farmers
mortgage loans
Game Theory
forest right
作者简介
刘欣（1986-），男，在读硕士生，E-mail：lmkf@163．com
通讯作者：杨立社（1963-），男，硕土，教授，E-mail：yls1335@163．com
